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THE DNA OF AN ARGUMENT: A CASE
STUDY IN LEGAL LOGOS
COLIN STARGER*
This Article develops a framework for analyzing legal argument
through an in-depth case study of the debate over federal actions for
postconviction DNA access. Building on the Aristotelian concept of logos,
this Article maintains that the persuasive power of legal logic depends in
part on the rhetorical characteristics of premises, inferences, and
conclusions in legal proofs. After sketching a taxonomy that distinguishes
between prototypical argument logoi (formal, empirical, narrative, and
categorical), the Article applies its framework to parse the rhetorical
dynamics at play in litigation over postconviction access to DNA evidence
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, focusing in particular on the procedural
controversy over using § 1983 instead of federal habeas to seek DNA
testing (the so-called Heck problem). The essential competing logics in this
debate are unpacked through close readings of the clashing opinions of
Judge Luttig and Chief Judge Wilkinson in the Harvey II case. The logos of
Judge Luttig's argument in support of § 1983 DNA-access actions is
classified as formal because it presents itself as a deductive application of
the Heck rule whereas the logos of Chief Judge Wilkinson's counter-
argument is classified as narrative because it interprets Heck as part of a
larger story about the "morality of process." Three primary claims are
then advanced. First, based on an empirical review of all cases in the
debate, it is argued that Judge Luttig's proof has exerted a singularly
persuasive influence on the § 1983 DNA access discourse. Second, it is
claimed that the rhetorical success of Judge Luttig's opinion derives from
the formal logos of his Heck argument. Finally, the persuasive appeal of
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Luttig's formal logos is attributed to its resonance with the relevant
Supreme Court doctrine, which also evinces a formal logos in its approach
to jurisdictional line-drawing. As this Article was accepted for publication
prior to the Court's decision in Osborne, a § 1983 DNA-access action, it
used its rhetorical analysis to buttress an ex ante prediction that Heck
would present no bar for William Osborne. In an ex post Epilogue, the
(mostly vindicated) analysis is assessed.
I. INTRODUCTION"
Law inevitably pits arguments against one another. Some win, some
lose. In a dispute where on-the-books law or on-the-ground facts clearly
favor one side over another, argument rarely determines the outcome. But
in closer cases, what accounts for the relative success of embattled legal
arguments? Does an argument's logic explain its persuasive power? In this
Article, I construct an answer to these questions by developing a rhetorical
framework that distinguishes categories of argument logic. I maintain that
legal arguments persuade differently depending on how their premises,
inferences, and conclusions are logically constituted. I introduce this
rhetorical framework through an in-depth case study of the federal court
debate over postconviction access to DNA evidence. The Supreme Court is
now set to rule on the Osborne case emerging from this debate,' and I use
my framework to justify a partial prediction of what argument logic will
prevail in the Court.2
Understanding the multi-faceted DNA access debate presented by
Osborne initially requires a sifting through layers of argument. At its
** This Article was completed and accepted for publication in mid-March 2009,
approximately three months before the Supreme Court handed down its June 18, 2009
decision in District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009). To preserve the
integrity of the Article's ex ante prediction about Osborne, I have not altered the content of
my argument in light of the actual decision. Rather, I explore how well my prediction fared
in a separate Epilogue below. See infra Part V.
Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 488 (2008). Osborne was argued and submitted on March 2, 2009. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 488 (No. 08-6). In the interest of full disclosure, I was
counsel for respondent in this case for four years during litigation in the District Court of
Alaska and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. I also appear on the Brief for Respondent in the
Supreme Court. See Brief for the Respondent, Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (hereinafter
Osborne Respondent's Brief). Although I have played an advocate's role in these
proceedings, I tackle the rhetorical issues presented through a scholar's lens in this Article.
2 The Court accepted certiorari on two questions-one procedural and one substantive.
See infra note 7 and accompanying text. My prediction is partial because it is confined to
the procedural question. See infra Part V.C. Though I focus on the procedural question, my
analysis also fundamentally concerns the rhetorical stakes and logical consequences of
attempting to sever the procedural question from its substantive counterpart.
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highest level of abstraction, the current postconviction DNA access debate
concerns how proof intersects with legal process. DNA's extraordinary
forensic power to determine guilt or innocence has challenged traditional
notions of finality for criminal convictions where proof was adduced
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Postconviction DNA exonerations have
shown that, however reasonable at the time, mistaken trial judgments of
guilt can result in wrongful convictions.3 While DNA testing gained
acceptance in the 1990s as a means of accurately identifying suspects with
scientific certainty, providing postconviction access to this uniquely
probative form of proof quickly became a major issue in criminal justice
discourse.4 State legislatures began to enact postconviction DNA testing
statutes and prisoners began litigating access claims under these statutes in
an attempt to prove their innocence.5
Out of this general conversation about postconviction DNA access, a
specific federal court discourse emerged. As the millennium turned, federal
courts began to entertain a new type of DNA access action filed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals
whose constitutional and federal civil rights have been violated by persons
acting "under color of' state law.6 Section 1983 DNA access suits are
brought by convicted criminals against civil plaintiffs to gain access to
biological evidence held by the state. The biological evidence sought
relates to the crime for which the plaintiff was convicted. The plaintiff
asserts that a forensic DNA test of this evidence would yield results proving
the plaintiffs innocence. The basic argument asserts that the defendants
3 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73-120 (2008)
(analyzing errors in trials and appeals of the first two hundred postconviction DNA
exonerations).
4 One major force to press this issue was the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In 1996,
the National Institute of Justice issued a report detailing twenty-eight postconviction DNA
exonerations and analyzing the arising implications. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE
USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996). The DOJ then
published a highly influential report in 1999 that advocated allowing postconviction DNA
testing. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS iii (1999)
("The analysis offered by these recommendations applies DNA technology to the appeals
process while recognizing the value of finality in the criminal justice system. Where DNA
can establish actual innocence, the recommendations encourage the pursuit of truth over the
invocation of appellate time bars.").
5 See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1629, 1670-84 (2008)
(analyzing forty-four state postconviction DNA statutes and discussing judicial rulings that
interpreted them).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights by refusing, under color of law,
to allow access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence.
This federal court discourse, in turn, implicates numerous doctrinal
disputes over the propriety of § 1983 DNA access actions. Various strands
of debate have percolated through the federal courts as prisoners with
unique factual circumstances advanced alternate justifications for finding a
substantive right and faced a myriad of procedural defenses. In Osborne,
the Supreme Court is weighing in on two of these issues: (1) whether a
postconviction DNA access claim is cognizable under the procedural
vehicle of § 1983; and (2) whether a substantive constitutional right exists
to access DNA evidence after conviction.7
In this Article, I extricate the logic of the competing arguments on the
first question presented in Osborne and carefully analyze their relative
persuasive power. In broad strokes, this specific procedural debate
concerns whether prisoners are barred from bringing DNA access actions
under § 1983 because of a line of Supreme Court cases that starts with
Preiser v. Rodriguez8 and most prominently includes Heck v. Humphrey.
9
Taken together, cases in the Preiser-Heck family police a boundary
between § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute-the traditional
avenue available for prisoners seeking postconviction relief in federal
courts) 0 Depending on how the logic of the Preiser-Heck cases is
understood, § 1983 DNA access actions may or may not "necessarily
imply" the invalidity of the prisoner's criminal conviction and fall on the
wrong side of this boundary."
7 I have attempted to neutrally state the questions presented. However, the State
(technically, the regional District Attorney's Office in Anchorage, Alaska) (petitioner) and
Osborne (respondent) certainly contest the precise formulation of these questions. Compare,
e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308
(2009) (No. 08-6) ("May Osborne use § 1983 as a discovery device for obtaining
postconviction access to the state's biological evidence when he has no pending substantive
claim for which that evidence would be material?") with Osborne Respondent's Brief, supra
note 1, at I ("Whether a state prisoner's claim that he is entitled to obtain postconviction
access to evidence for DNA testing may be brought in an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983.").
8 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
9 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
10 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Preiser-Heck cases consciously engage in line
drawing that prescribes the conditions under which substantive debate is possible. See, e.g.,
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489 ("[D]espite the literal applicability of [§ 1983's] terms, the question
remains whether the specific federal habeas corpus statute . . . must be understood to be the
exclusive remedy available in a situation like this where it so clearly applies."); Heck, 512
U.S. at 480 ("This case lies at the intersection of the two most fertile sources of federal-court
prisoner litigation-the Civil Rights Act of 1871[, ] 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the federal habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.").
" See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 ("[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
1048 [Vol. 99
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None of the existing scholarship on postconviction DNA testing
employs a rhetorical approach to expose the underlying logic of competing
doctrinal arguments. Some scholars have advanced doctrinal arguments in
favor of finding a substantive constitutional right to postconviction DNA
access.'2 Others have confronted the specific Preiser-Heck question that is
my core concern and concluded that no procedural bar should apply to
§ 1983 DNA access actions.1 3  While this work elucidates the doctrinal
landscape of the DNA argument, my contribution is a new meta-analysis of
how persuasion functions within this landscape.
In order to analyze the persuasive power of competing arguments in
the Preiser-Heck debate, I undertake a rhetorical case study analyzing
which arguments have persuaded federal judges who have participated in
§ 1983 DNA access discourse. The first federal § 1983 DNA access
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.").
12 See Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 241-311 (2008) (arguing
for a constitutional fight based on overruling of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood); Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind Factual
Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV 547, 547-617 (2002)
(reviewing arguments of early § 1983 DNA access action pioneers for the existence of a
constitutional right); see also Sophia S. Chang, Comment, Protecting the Innocent: Post-
Conviction DNA Exoneration, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 291-94 (2009) (arguing for a
constitutional right of access); Elizabeth A. Laughton, iBrief, McKithen v. Brown: Due
Process and Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 2008 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 7 (arguing against
the existence of a constitutional right for plaintiff in McKithen v. Brown). Some student
scholars have concluded that doctrinal uncertainty means that legislation is necessary to
guarantee postconviction access to DNA testing. See J. Brent Alldredge, Comment, Federal
Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Claims of Actual Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56
SMU L. Rev. 1005, 1019-20 (2003); David A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction
Access to DNA Testing: The Federal Government Does Not Offer An Adequate Solution,
Leaving the States to Remedy the Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV., 1245, 1245-74 (2008);
Rachel Steinback, Comment, The Fight for Post-Conviction DNA Testing Is Not Yet Over:
An Analysis of the Eight Remaining "Holdout States" and Suggestions for Strategies to
Bring Vital Relief to the Wrongfully Convicted, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 329-61
(2007).
13 Student commentators advance these arguments. See Dylan Ruga, Comment, Federal
Court Adjudication of State Prisoner Claims for Post-Conviction DNA Testing: A Bifurcated
Approach, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 35, 35-55 (2004) (arguing that DNA access claims should be
permitted under § 1983 and that exoneration claims should be permitted under federal
habeas); Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to
DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 588 (2004) (arguing that DNA access actions should
be permitted under § 1983); see also Note, Defining the Reach ofHeck v. Humphrey: Should
the Favorable Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?,
121 HARV. L. REV., 868, 875 n.49 (2008) (noting the Preiser-Heck problem in DNA access
cases in context of the argument that § 1983 should be available to state court prisoners who
are barred from seeking habeas relief).
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decision was published on September 29, 2000 and involved an individual
named James Harvey.' 4 The Supreme Court accepted review in William
Osborne's case on November 3, 2008.15 During the intervening eight years,
federal courts issued approximately three dozen decisions in § 1983 DNA
access actions that were published in Federal Reporters or made available
on Westlaw. 16 These decisions record rulings from various stages of § 1983
actions brought by twenty-one different individuals. 7 The opinions from
these twenty-one separate controversies define the specific textual
boundaries of this rhetorical case study. 1
8
14 Harvey v. Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581, 582 (E.D. Va. 2000). As explained below, at
least one other federal court had considered a § 1983 DNA access action before this date, but
no decision from this litigation was ever published. See infra note 97 (discussing Clyde
Charles case).
15 Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008) (mem.).
16 I counted thirty-eight of these decisions in this period. However, I decline to consider
two cases filed by pro se litigants as part of this federal discourse because of their
pronounced pleading deficiencies. See Order of Dismissal, Bivins v. Contra Costa City,
No. 3:08-02570 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 4407876, at *3 (dismissing action but
granting leave to file amended complaint because "the Court does not understand" the nature
of pro se plaintiffs action); Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint, Clifton v. Byrd,
No. 1:08-00193 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008), 2008 WL 1805780 (dismissing action because
pro se plaintiff sued wrong defendant but granting leave to refile complaint). For a list of the
remaining thirty-six decisions, see infra note 18. In addition, I am not including in this
analysis four district court decisions that were published after the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Osborne. See Young v. Philadelphia County, No. 08-3463, 2009 WL 27895
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2009) (barring action on statute of limitation grounds); Clifton v. Cline,
No. 1:08-0193, 2009 WL 256548 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009) (dismissing action for suing
wrong defendant); Yoris v. Ober, No. 8:08-01202, 2009 WL 249975 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30,
2009) (barring action on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Ross v. Lehigh County, No. 07-2329,
2008 WL 5234411 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2008) (barring action on statute of limitation grounds).
17 These twenty-one cases are discussed in thirty-six different decisions. Eleven cases
have produced multiple opinions. See infra note 18,
18 In chronological order, the decisions are: Harvey v. Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D.
Va. 2000); Harvey v. Horan, No. 00-1123, 2001 WL 419142 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2001);
Godschalk v. Montgomery County, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Harvey v. Horan,
278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v.
Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002); Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340 (6th
Cir. 2002); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's
Office, 423 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005); Moore v. Lockyer, No. 04-1952, 2005 WL 2334350
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005); Savory v. Lyons, No. 05-2082, 2005 WL 3543833 (C.D. Ill. Dec.
28, 2005); Alley v. Key, 431 F. Supp. 2d 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2006); Alley v. Key, No. 06-
5552, 2006 WL 1313364 (6th Cir. May 14, 2006) (not recommended for publication);
Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (D. Alaska 2006); Grayson v.
King, 460 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2006); Thompson v. Crist, 200 F. App'x 895 (11th Cir.
2006); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 2006); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667
(7th Cir. 2006); Breest v. New Hampshire, 472 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H. 2007); Smith v.
Worthy, No. 4:07-10243, 2007 WL 295007 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2007); McKithen v. Brown,
481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); Harrison v. Dumanis, No. 06-2470, 2007 WL 1159976 (S.D.
1050 [Vol. 99
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While the closed universe of twenty-one controversies provides the
original data for this case study, the conceptual framework I use to analyze
this data is rhetorical. In developing the framework, I consciously follow a
tradition that begins with Aristotle 19 and continues with neo-Aristotelian
argument scholars like Stephen Toulmin20 and Chaim Perelman. 2I Like
these thinkers, I reject any pejorative understandings of rhetoric as mere
flattery or devious sophistry.22 In my view, rhetoric is properly regarded as
a hard-nosed affair where the practical art of persuasion collides with the
abstract theory of how argument moves discourse.
In the following Parts of this Article, I elaborate my rhetorical
framework and apply it to analyze the persuasive dynamics of competing
Preiser-Heck arguments in § 1983 postconviction DNA access discourse.
Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); Gilkey v. Livingston, No. 3:06-1903, 2007 WL 1953456 (N.D. Tex.
June 27, 2007); Arthur v. King, No. 2:07-319, 2007 WL 2381992 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 17,
2007); Arthur v. King, No. 2:07-319, 2007 WL 2539962 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2007); Arthur
v. King, 500 F.3d 1335 (1lth Cir. 2007); Thompson v. McCollum, 253 F. App'x 11 (11th
Cir. 2007); Breest v. New Hampshire, No. 06-361, 2008 WL 183240 (D.N.H. Jan. 18, 2008);
McDaniel v. Suthers, No. 08-00223, 2008 WL 591799 (D. Colo. March 3, 2008); Wambolt
v. Chittenden County, No. 2:07-167 (D. Vt. Mar. 7, 2008), 2008 WL 682588; Osborne v.
Dist. Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008); Gilkey v. Livingston, 275 F. App'x
273 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Morgan v. Satz, No. 08-80379, 2008 WL 2694745 (S.D.
Fla. May 29, 2008); McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Moore v.
Brown, 295 F. App'x 176 (9th Cir. 2008); McDaniel v. Suthers, No. 08-00223, 2008 WL
4527697 (D. Colo. Oct. 2, 2008). After the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Osborne,
the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision in the Bradley case cited in this footnote. See Bradley
v. King, 556 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2009), sub nom. Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287 (11th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1306 (2009).
19 See generally ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE (George A.
Kennedy trans., 2d ed. 2007) (hereinafter RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR.). Aristotle's On
Rhetoric has proved the most influential and enduring treatise in rhetoric and also "often is
considered the foundation of the discipline of communication." SONJA K. FOSS ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC 7 (3d ed. 2002).
20 See generally STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (updated ed. 2003);
ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL
REASONING (1988); STEPHEN TOULMIN, RETURN TO REASON (2001). For a useful overview
of Toulmin's work and biography, see Foss ET AL, supra note 19, at 117-53.
21 See generally CH. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT
(John Petrie trans., 1963); CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969); CH.
PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING (John
Petrie et al. trans., 1980); CH. PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (William Kluback trans.,
1982). See also FOSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 81-115 (providing an introduction to the work
of Perelman and his important collaborator, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca).
22 Chaim Perelman describes this pejorative understanding of rhetoric as arising from the
"great tradition of Western metaphysics which Parmenides, Plato, Descartes, and Kant
represent[, and which] has always contrasted the search after truth ... to the techniques of
the rhetoricians and Sophists." PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC, supra note 21, at 5.
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Although I focus on the procedural question raised by § 1983 and Preiser-
Heck, I also unpack the rhetorical connection between procedure and
substance in the debate over whether there exists a constitutional right of
access to postconviction DNA evidence.
In Part II, I introduce the critical concept that anchors my rhetorical
framework-logos (plural logoi). Logos is a rhetorical term of art that
Aristotle famously employed to describe argument based on reason.23 In
that Part, I explore the relationship between logic and logos and offer my
own understanding of logos as the reasoned progression from premises to a
conclusion supported by inference. Here, I also develop an original
taxonomy that distinguishes between formal, empirical, narrative, and
categorical types of logos. I briefly explain how formal, empirical,
narrative, and categorical logoi operate as entirely different modes of proof
in argument.
In Part III, I advance my first major claim about the federal
postconviction DNA access debate. I maintain that one particular opinion
emerging from this discourse has influenced federal judges confronting
§ 1983 DNA access questions more than any other-the concurrence of
Judge Michael Luttig in a decision known as Harvey 11.24 To contextualize
this claim, I first tell the litigation story of James Harvey, which gave rise to
the Harvey I decision, and contrast it with the parallel tale of Harvey's
§ 1983 contemporary, Bruce Godschalk. I then argue that empirical review
of citation patterns of the nineteen post-Harvey 1I controversies in the case
study provide prima facie evidence that Judge Luttig's Harvey II opinion
has exerted profound sway over the postconviction DNA access debate.
In Part IV, I begin the argument that the remarkable persuasive impact
of Judge Luttig's Harvey II opinion derives from the particular logos of his
Preiser-Heck argument. Part IV explains this claim in two basic steps.
First, I describe how Harvey II effectively pitted Judge Luttig against his
ostensibly concurring colleague Chief Judge Harvie Wilkinson 111.25 I
closely parse both Luttig's and Wilkinson's opinions to isolate their
operative premises and inferences and suggest that their arguments
perfectly capture the competing logoi of the doctrinal conflict over Preiser-
Heck. Second, I apply the categories that I developed in Part II and classify
the formal logos of Luttig's argument as compared to the narrative logos of
Wilkinson's argument. Luttig agues that the formal letter of the so-called
23 See RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 38.
24 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 11), 285 F.3d 298, 304-26 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
25 Compare Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 298-304 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of
rehearing and rehearing en banc), with id. at 304-26 (Luttig, J, respecting denial of rehearing
en banc).
1052 [Vol. 99
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"Heck rule" should render DNA access actions cognizable under § 1983,
whereas Wilkinson argues that the narrative spirit of Preiser-Heck should
lead to the opposite conclusion.
In Part V, I describe how federal courts analyzed the Preiser-Heck
question after Harvey II and how this conversation was impacted by the
Supreme Court decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson.26  I argue that Dotson
effectively vindicated Luttig's formal logos and helped persuade federal
courts of the propriety of Luttig's formal reading of the Heck rule. In that
Part, I advocate a theoretical conception of logos as "discursive coherence"
that links the persuasive power of an argument to its resonance with the
logos of the underlying discourse. Because I see Luttig's logos as
resonating with the logos of the Preiser-Heck discourse, I hazard a
prediction that his view will prevail at the Supreme Court in Osborne.
I conclude the Article by exploring some implications of my analysis
of the postconviction DNA access debate and suggesting useful avenues for
the application and development of my rhetorical framework.
II. LOGIC, LOGOS, AND LEGAL ARGUMENT
The proper role of logic in law has long been contested. As Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes memorably observed:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed.
27
In opposing law and logic, Holmes attacked the Formalist view that saw
legal outcomes as logically determined through the deductive application of
prior principles to present facts.28 Of course, Holmes's basic point that law
does not operate as "a logic of rigid demonstration ' 29 remains axiomatic in
the legal academy.3°
26 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
27 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
28 For an insightful exploration of Holmes' critique, see John Dewey, Logical Method
and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 20-22 (1924). Dewey accepted that "the formal theory of the
syllogism" does not fit well with law because it improperly "implies that for every possible
case which may arise, there is a fixed antecedent rule already at hand; that the case in
question is either simple and unambiguous, or is resolvable by direct inspection into a
collection of simple and indubitable facts." Id. at 21-22.
29 See Dewey, supra note 28, at 21.
30 See Main Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-
Realist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 373 (2008) ("At the heart of realism lies the
belief that many, if not most, interesting cases cannot be definitively resolved through the
purely logical application of existing precedent and generally accepted legal principle."). I
10532009]
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Though pure formal logic seems inapplicable, commentators since
Holmes have struggled to understand whether other non-formal types of
logic play a legitimate role in legal reasoning. John Dewey, for example,
proposed long ago that law might be viewed as an empirical "logic of
prediction of probabilities rather than one of deduction of certainties. '31
Dewey's insight that plural logical types exist in law is certainly useful.32
However, a recalcitrant problem has been one of definition and
categorization. Contemporary legal commentators do not agree on just
what logic means in legal reasoning and what kinds of logic are at play in
legal argument.33
To bypass this longstanding semantic confusion, I orient my inquiry
into legal argument to logos rather than logic. From the original Greek, the
word logos may be translated as "discourse," "speech," "word," or
"reason. ' 34  As a rhetorical term of art, logos is "a mode of proof...
cautiously classify this insight as "axiomatic" because it now appears as a self-evident, if not
a priori, truth. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 13 (axioms are self-
evident premises considered valid without proof).
31 See Dewey, supra note 28, at 26. Dewey's logic of predicting possibilities might be
thought of as inductive as opposed to deductive logic. In a move that anticipated both the
Realists and modem Empirical Legal Studies, Dewey advocated conceiving of law as a
collection of "general legal rules and principles [that] are working hypotheses, needing to be
constantly tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete situations."
Id. at 26; cf Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CH1. L.
REV. 831, 831 (2008) ("We are in the midst of a flowering of 'large-scale quantitative
studies of facts and outcome,' with numerous published results. The relevant studies have
produced a New Legal Realism-an effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on
the basis of testable hypotheses and large data sets.").
32 See Dewey, supra note 28, at 21 (discussing "the need of another kind of logic" and
observing that "there are different logics in use").
33 This lack of consensus partially derives from a lack of debate over foundational terms.
Commentators sympathetic to logic's application in law usually proceed as if the meaning of
the term was self-evident. For example, Judge Ruggero Aldisert does not define "logic" in
his influential introductory primer on legal logic. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR
LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 1-2 (3d ed. 1997) (offering his text as a
"modest attempt to fill th[e] void" of books about "legal logic" and stating only that he uses
that term "interchangeably with legal reasoning."). Even more sophisticated scholars tend to
offer only oblique definition. See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF
LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 54 (2005) (describing the gap between "logic as a
specialist discipline" and the "applied logic" of law, which is loosely presented as "the kind
of syllogistic reasoning that is at the kernel of legal reasoning"). But see Vein R. Walker,
Discovering the Logic of Legal Reasoning, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1687, 1688 n.1 (2007)
(explicitly defining "logic" as "the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish
correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning") (quoting IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN,
INTRODUCTION To LOGIC 3 (10th ed. 1998)).
34 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1654 (1971)
(hereinafter "OED").
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understood as rational argument or appeal[] based on reason. 35 Logos is
also the etymological root of "logic.
36
Considering the familial meanings of logos and the term's
etymological relationship to logic, logos may be rightly regarded as
"rational argument logic." Logos concerns how "reason" proves arguments
in "discourse." As the translations of logos suggest, the primary
"discourse" of logos is "speech" and "word." While symbolic or
mathematical "logic" may be thought of as a very specialized subset of
logos, the more central meaning of logos is reason-based proof in natural
language.
Given the law's inherent preoccupation with rational argument in
natural language, logos provides a resonant heading under which legal
proof may be discussed. Though initially unfamiliar, logos also seems a
preferable term to logic, which retains conflicting and troublesome
connotations within the legal academy. Though certainly not beyond
controversy itself,37 logos presents a relatively clean slate on which to write
about legal argument.
A. ETHOS, PATHOS, AND LOGOS
In his classic treatise, On Rhetoric, Aristotle categorizes rhetoric as an
art, 38 and defines it as "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the
available means of persuasion. ' 39  Aristotle famously identified three
fundamental artistic proofs in rhetoric-ethos, pathos, and logos.40  All
35 JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY
RHETORICAL STUDIES 350 (2001).
36 OED, supra note 34, at 1653 (1971) (cross-referencing entry on logos). According to
the Oxford English Dictionary, the elliptical form of logos that became "logic" is first found
in Cicero. Cicero was a Roman lawyer and is considered-along with Aristotle and
Quintilian-to be a founder of classical forensic rhetoric. See MICHAEL H. FROST,
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 2-3 (2005). Even though
some would drive a wedge between logic and rhetoric, logic's own etymology reveals that it
was in fact born from rhetoric.
37 While the modern legal reader will likely find logic a more controversial term than
logos, it is certainly true that logos has a long and contested history in philosophy and
theology. See 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 919-21 (1 lth ed. 1911); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RHETORIC 456-67 (Thomas 0. Sloane ed. 2001); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC AND
COMPOSITION 410-14 (Theresa Enos ed. 1996); JASINSKI, supra note 35, at 350-51.
38 RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 31 ("[Rhetoric] is the activity of an art
[tekhni].").
" Id. at 37.
40 Id. Ethos, pathos, and logos are called artistic proofs because they are intrinsic to the
art of rhetoric. Aristotle also recognized kinds of proof as extrinsic to rhetoric and so called
them "non-artistic." Id. at 38. The conceptual difference between artistic and non-artistic
pisteis rests on invention. Advocates do not invent non-artistic pisteis; they are externally
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three of these proofs seek to gain the acceptance by an audience of a
speaker's theses or proposed judgment. Proof by ethos persuades by
building up the character of the speaker and conveying that the speaker's
theses are worthy of credence. 4' Proof by pathos disposes the audience to
feel emotions conducive to accepting the proposed judgment.42 Finally,
proof by logos derives from the argument itself and shows the truth or
apparent truth of the proposition asserted.43
Aristotle classified ethos, pathos, and logos as types of pistis-a word
that can be translated either as "proof' or as "means of persuasion."
44
Using the same word to connote "proof' and "means of persuasion" may
unnerve strict positivists, but the unifying conception makes perfect sense
in legal discourse where argument "proves" truth and the "truth" that
matters is that which a judge, jury, or other fact-finder accepts as
persuasive.45 Criminal adjudications provide a quintessential example of
the dual meanings of pistis in action: the truth of a "guilty" verdict is
backed by proof calibrated directly to the "reasonable doubt" of an
individual jury. Proof is what persuades.
In Aristotle's formulation of proof and persuasion functioning through
ethos, pathos, and logos, we see the ancient origins of the familiar modem
conception of the communication triangle. In a communication triangle,
speaker and audience and subject matter are joined in language. 46  In a
provided, and advocates use them to prove their case. Id. Aristotle identified several
extrinsic proofs such as "witnesses", "testimony of slaves taken under torture", and
"contracts." Id. In broad strokes then, non-artistic proofs concern evidence rather than
argument.
41 RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 38-39.
42 Id. at 39. Note that my use of the word pathos here differs slightly from Aristotle's
use. He did not actually use the term pathos for the proof of disposing the audience in some
way. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIvic DISCOURSE 37-38 n.40 (George A.
Kennedy trans., 1991). This is because pathos is an attribute of a person (feeling emotion),
not of speech. However, the ethos-pathos-logos formulation is a widely used and convenient
shorthand for the three artistic modes of persuasion. Id. (Please note that here I cite to the
first edition of the Kennedy translation of On Rhetoric. Unfortunately, the second edition
that I generally refer to in this Article omits this useful footnote and discussion of pathos.).
43 RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 39.
4Id. at31 n.11.
45 As one commentator puts it, "[Liegal argumentation is not concerned with proof of
absolute truths, but acknowledges that it is always possible to argue for or against a
particular claim." Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 3 J. ASS'N
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 164, 165 (2006). Professor Saunders explicitly connects
Aristotle's notion of practical argumentation to legal reasoning and the modem argument
studies of Cha'im Perelman and Stephen Toulmin. Id. at 166-76.
46 There are many ways to represent a communication triangle, but all distinguish
between the medium of discourse and the three points of contact-speaker, audience, and
topic. See, e.g., EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR
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typical legal argument, a communication triangle links litigants (speakers)
to a judge or jury (audience) concerning a case or controversy (subject
matter). Arguments seeking to establish a conclusion in a legal discourse
may be regarded as rooted in the credibility of a litigant (ethos), the
disposition of the judge or jury (pathos), or the reason in the case itself
(logos).
By casting legal arguments as communication triangles, I aim to
emphasize that such arguments unfold in natural language. Within the law,
judicial and statutory texts constitute the specific language of authority.
These texts, in turn, imply communication's context. Like one of
Wittgenstein's "language-games," a legal argument "consist[s] of language
and the actions into which it is woven. ' ' 7 Depending on the discursive
frame employed, arguments within the law involve distinct actors and
institutions, norms and conventions, and other kinds of practices and
actions.
While I focus on logos-based proof, it is certainly true that any given
argument may combine logical (logos), ethical (ethos), and pathetic
(pathos) appeals in intertwining ways that cannot be neatly separated.
However, as doctrine evolves on a specific issue, the individual litigants
arguing the issue and judges deciding it necessarily change. In this more
abstracted discourse, over time, particularized appeals to ethos and pathos
become less significant. As various district and appellate courts moot a
particular legal issue, one hopes that logos becomes more prominent.
Of course, I do not deny the reality that legal actors and institutions
may harbor biases and prejudices that are not governed by reason. At the
same time, I reject the notion that rationality plays no role in legal
adjudication.48 Indeed, what strikes me as particularly compelling about the
debates at the center of this case study is precisely how much of the conflict
THE MODERN STUDENT 2 (4th ed. 1999) (describing a communication triangle in the medium
of text linking speaker/writer, listener/reader, and subject matter); Teresa Godwin Phelps,
The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089, 1091 (1986) (citing J. KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF
DISCOURSE 19 (1971)) (describing a communication triangle in the medium of signal
(language) linking encoder (writer), decoder (reader), and reality); see also Linda L. Berger,
A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000).
47 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS pt. 1, § 7, at 5 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1958) (1953). For Wittgenstein,
there is no meaningful boundary between language and action-they are discursively joined.
See id. pt. I, § 23, at 11 ("[T]he term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.").
48 See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9 (1986) (charging
critical legal studies with rejecting rationality in law). I share in Professor Fiss' view that a
total rejection of law's claim to rationality is ill-advised and that we must sometimes "take
the law on its own terms." Id. at 2.
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finds direct expression in reasoned argument. In both the broader disputes
about how DNA intersects with legal proof and the narrower question of
whether DNA access actions are cognizable under § 1983, logos appears to
matter.
B. TAXONOMY OF ARGUMENT LOGOS
In order to analyze the competing logoi of the postconviction DNA
access debate, I first build on the rhetorical understanding of logos that has
its origins in Aristotle. On my account, logos can be further specified as the
reasoned progression in argument from premises to a conclusion supported
by inference. This formulation allows me to disaggregate the building
blocks of logos by reference to the component parts of an argument. From
this understanding, variations in how arguments logically constitute
premises, inferences, and conclusions become variations in types of
argument logos.
I distinguish between four types of argument logos: formal, empirical,
narrative, and categorical. The purpose animating the taxonomy is to
provide a new vocabulary that distinguishes between modes of proof in
legal argument. My working assumption is that discrete kinds of legal
arguments may be receptive to different modes of logical proof.
49
This scheme is not posited as a precise categorization based on strict
definition.50  Rather, the different argument logoi I identify are related
through kinship; they bear "family resemblances" to each other. 51  I
therefore describe the prototypical characteristics of formal, empirical,
narrative, and categorical arguments while recognizing that some arguments
may resist pigeonholing. Building from logos, I seek to bring new rigor and
49 In suggesting that discrete kinds of legal arguments exist, I follow Toulmin's notion of
argument "fields" governed by different logical types. See TOULMIN, THE USES OF
ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at 14 ("Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field
when the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same
logical type: they will be said to come from different fields when the backing or the
conclusions in each of the two arguments are not of the same logical type."). While Toulmin
does not use the term logos, his conception of "logical type" is similar.
50 The boundaries between different types of argument logoi are diffuse because modes
of proof constantly intersect and overlap in the real-world debate. In this way, argument
logos is a language game, just like argument itself. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text (describing legal argument as a language game). As Wittgenstein observed, it is quite
impossible to describe the concept of "game" with "definition[al] exactness" because the
concept itself has "blurred edges." WrITTGENSTEIN, supra note 47, pt. I, § 69, at 33 & § 71, at
34.
51 See id. § 67 (describing "family resemblances" among games and words).
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terminology to the essential business of understanding proof and persuasion
in law.52
1. Formal Logos
This category describes the familiar type of proof that Holmes
associated with syllogism. 53  In formal logos, premise is literally
everything. 54 Premises of formal argument are known and explicit and are
themselves beyond debate. 55 Formal premises are thus accepted a priori or
ex concessis-they are true either by definition or by dint of
incontrovertible authority.56 From formal premises, necessary conclusions
follow deductively.
In its strictest sense, formal logos does not describe a mode of
argument at all, but rather the chains of reasoning in analytic
demonstration. 57  It is the Cartesian logic of self-evidence and necessity
52 I do not mean to suggest that the rhetorical tradition is not already rigorous. Indeed, in
addition to his status as a founder of rhetoric, Aristotle is also the acknowledged inventor of
that most rigorous of philosophical disciplines-formal logic. See The Great Ideas: I, in 2
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 720-27 (Mortimer J. Adler & William Gorman eds.,
31st prtg. 1989) (entry on "Logic"). Interestingly, Aristotle never used the word "logic,"
logos, or any of its cognates to describe the science or art of the syllogism. Id. Rather, the
syllogism belonged to the science of apodeixis, which is usually translated as
"demonstration." See RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 33 n.20.
53 A syllogism proceeds deductively from two premises, major and minor, to a necessary
conclusion. The canonical example of a syllogism is "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man,
so therefore Socrates is mortal." In this example, the general proposition about man's
mortality is the major premise while Socrates' inclusion in the class of men is the minor
premise. The conclusion that Socrates is mortal is formally entailed by the syllogism's
antecedent premises.
54 In formal logic, conclusions are wholly entailed by premises; formal conclusions state
nothing new. For this reason, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that "on the level of
formal logic[,] the accusation of begging the question is meaningless. It could indeed be
maintained that any formally correct deduction consists of a petitio principii and the
principle of identity, affirming that any proposition implies itself, then becomes a
formalization of the petitio principii." PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at
112.
55 For Aristotle, the syllogism leads to a necessary conclusion because it proceeds from
explicit and universally true premises. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 46, at 53.
Aristotle actually gave a different name to arguments formed like syllogisms but where
premises were implied (rather than explicit) or probable (rather than necessary)-
enthymeme. Id.; see also RHETORIC-KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 41-42 & n.55.
56 A priori ("what is before") and ex concessis ("in view of what has already been
accepted") both describe propositions beyond dispute. See generally BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 111, 607 (8th ed. 2004). A priori can also describe the process of deductively
reasoning itself. Id. at 111.
57 See PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC, supra note 21, at 2 ("Since truth is a
property of the proposition and is independent of personal opinion, analytical reasoning is
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embodied by the proofs of Euclidean geometry. 8 However, when the
context changes from pure axiomatic systems to more practical discourses,
such as law, formal logos describes the consistent application of rules. 59 In
practical argument, formal logos captures the ideal of unambiguous
deduction from clear definition.60
2. Empirical Logos
Like their formal counterparts, premises in empirical arguments are
also usually known and explicit.6' However, empirical premises are only
accepted a posteriori and always remain subject to experimental revision.62
Arguments here proceed by induction and concern probable rather than
demonstrative and impersonal."); see also supra note 52 (defining apodeixis as Greek term
for demonstration).
58 See JONSEN & TOuLMIN, supra note 20, at 24-29; PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA,
supra note 21, at 1-4.
59 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword." The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 58 (1992) ("A legal directive is 'rule'-like when
it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited
triggering facts.") (citing Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 381
(1985)). Sullivan does not use the phrase "formal logos", but her definition of a rule
"associates rules with legal formality or 'formal realizability."' Id. at 58 n.232. The
literature on the application of rules in law is, of course, immense. In addition to Sullivan's
excellent introduction, see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991);
MACCORMICK, supra note 33, at 32-77 (analyzing role of syllogism and deduction in law);
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995).
60 Here, I use "deduction" in the sense of "set procedure[] of computation by which to
pass from data to a conclusion." See TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at
112. Toulmin notes that though this use of the term may offend formal logicians, it is the
sense in which eminently rational beings-from Sherlock Holmes to astronomers-use the
word, and one that is therefore eminently reasonable. Id. at 112-13. See also MACCORMICK,
supra note 33, at 49-77; Sullivan, supra note 59, at 58 n.232.
61 As mentioned, my proposed distinctions between categories of logos are fluid rather
than rigid. I readily concede that much of empirical science operates according to highly
formalized mathematical rules and models. However, I hope here to stress the difference
between formal arguments anchored in idealized axiomatic systems and empirical arguments
anchored in experimental observation.
62 A posteriori ("from what comes after") can also refer to inductive reasoning itself. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 56, at 105. The fact that empirical premises can
always be challenged by future data leads to the so-called "problem of induction." See
Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On the Perils
of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485, 493-94 (1996). However, though it
presents a thorny problem from a formal point of view, the problem disappears in practical
reasoning. See TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at 151-53.
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necessary conclusions.63 Empirical logos describes the "logic of prediction
of possibilities" celebrated by Dewey and most commonly associated with
experimental science.64
The use of forensic DNA testing to identify a suspect as the source of
biology recovered at crime scenes serves as a paradigmatic example of an
argument employing empirical logos. Premises include both theoretical
assumptions from population genetics 65 and evidentiary assumptions about
the reliability of technological processes that isolate, amplify, and interpret
allele sequences on biological samples.66 Given these assumptions, DNA
laboratories make claims about whether suspects can be included as a
potential source of crime-scene evidence based on a matching DNA profile
and what the frequency of isolated genetic profiles are in the general
population. 67 Based on these empirical claims, prosecutors will in turn urge
the conclusion that suspects are "beyond a reasonable doubt" the sources of
crime scene evidence.
68
63 See CORBETr & CONNORS, supra note 46, at 32 (tracing deductive and inductive logic
to the Prior and Posterior Analytics of Aristotle's Organon); see also id. at 60-61
(describing induction).
64 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
65 See David H. Kaye, The Role of Race in DNA Statistics: What Experts Say, What
California Courts Allow, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 303, 304-06 (2008); JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC
DNA TYPING 465-96 (2d ed. 2005) (describing principles of population genetics and STR
population database analyses).
66 See William C. Thompson & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Turning a Blind Eye to Misleading
Scientific Testimony: Failure of Procedural Safeguards in a Capital Case, 18 ALD. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 151, 160-08 (2008) (describing the interpretive process in making DNA calls
in the context of a suspect call in Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866 (Va. 2000));
BUTLER, supra note 65, at 68, 313-86 (describing stochastic effects of PCR process and
analyzing STR technology and interpretative issues in genotyping).
67 Crime scene evidence could include "biological tissues such as saliva, skin, blood,
hair, or semen [] left at a crime scene." NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE,
supra note 4, at 1. If a person is excluded as the source of DNA, that DNA exclusion is
definite and not given a "random match probability" or "likelihood ratio." However, if DNA
includes a suspect, these quantities may be stated in "such mind-boggling figures as 'one in
nine hundred and fifty sextillion African Americans."' Kaye, supra note 65, at 304.
68 It is possible to conflate empirically grounded random-match probability claims
legitimately made by DNA laboratories (which detail the chances that a person chosen at
random would share the genetic profile that matches the suspect and crime-scene evidence)
with non-empirical source-probability claims (which purport to detail the chances that a
certain person is in fact the source of crime-scene evidence). This conflation is commonly
known as "the prosecutor's fallacy." See William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 169-71 (1987); David J. Balding





Where empirical logos generally governs highly quantified debates
over causality and connection in the empirical world,69 narrative logos
enters into more qualitative contests over preferable courses of action in the
normative world.70 The premises of narrative arguments are not necessarily
known and explicit as they are in formal and empirical arguments; neither
are they necessarily accepted as a priori or a posteriori truths. Rather, the
starting points for narrative arguments depend on how the story is told.
Narrative logos is thus the logic of storytelling.71  The conclusions of
narrative arguments justify certain endings as the "moral of the story"-the
preferable or appropriate result given what came before.72
If formal logos describes the logic of rules in legal argument, then
narrative logos tracks the logic of standards. 73 Narrative inferences are the
69 I repeat once again that my categories are not rigid and concede that empirical and
formal considerations join together to create theories about causality. Conversely, what I
term narrative logos could be divided between narratives about human agency and
normative-religious accounts. Though formulated differently, my thinking with respect to
theory, narrative, and categories is strongly influenced by the work of Anthony Amsterdam
and Jerome Bruner. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
32 (2000) ("If theories are about causes and connections in the natural world, and if
narratives are about human agency and its vicissitudes in the enterprises of life, then
normative-religious accounts are about human origins, human destiny, human
responsibilities, and human plights.").
70 In his seminal work on the connection between narrative and normativity, Robert
Cover used another Greek word, nomos, to describe the concept of a "normative universe."
See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-10 (1983). As I see it, narrative logos shares a familial connection to
nomos, but concerns more specifically the use of narrative in argument. Narrative logos
helps structure debates about nomos.
71 Though scholars have not used the phrase "narrative logos," there is of course a vast
literature that explores the connection between storytelling and legal argument. See
generally LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul D.
Gewirtz eds., 1996); LEWIS H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW As FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE
RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995). For useful collections of citations in the field applying
narrative theory to law, see AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 69, at 355-56 n.1; John B.
Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A Proposal for Reform, 53
DRAKE L. REV. 599, 608-13 (2005); Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and
Criminal Defendants'Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975, 980
n.17 (2008).
72 See Cover, supra note 70, at 5 ("[E]very narrative is insistent in its demand for its
prescriptive point, its moral."). Aesop's famous fables might thus be regarded as a pure
expression of narrative logos. To take but one of many possible examples: in order to justify
a claim that "[s]low and steady wins the race," Aesop tells the story of the Hare and the
Tortoise. See AESOP, AESOP'S FABLES 113-14 (D.L. Ashliman ed., V.S. Vernon Jones trans.,
Barnes & Noble Classics 2003) (1912).
73 See Sullivan, supra note 59, at 56-60, 66-67 (discussing logic of standards). For
sources discussing the logic of rules in law, see supra note 59.
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inferences of equity; they concern the spirit of the law rather than its
letter.74 Narrative logos is also implicated in arguments using etymology to
establish meanings of words or genealogy to establish legitimacy of
authority.
4. Categorical Logos
Finally, categorical logos operates in arguments over classification.
75
Premises here are familial groupings of all manners of words, concepts, and
objects in a discourse.76 Categorical premises will often take the form of
taxonomies that may or may not be made explicit in argument. Without
question, all argument-formal, empirical, or narrative-uses, invokes, and
contests categories.77
Though categories underlie all argument, categorical logos can be
distinguished from other logical modes of argument based on its use of
inference by analogy.78 Categorical logos justifies class membership by
comparison to a prototypical example79 rather than through appeal to
definition or history.80  This logos of analogy thus underlies much of the
74 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 69, at 134 ("Rhetorical narratives use a story
rather than a set of propositional assertions to prove something persuasively.").
75 The fluidity of logos categories applies with special force to the very category of
categorical logos. This is because categories are a necessary part of every argument-
formal, empirical, narrative-as they are in all facets of human existence. See AMSTERDAM
& BRUNER, supra note 69, at 19-53. However, I propose a separate kind of argument logos
here to stress the peculiar mode of "proof by comparison to prototypical example." See infra
note 78-79.
76 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 69, at 20-23. Familial groupings of categories
are sometimes formalized as taxonomies. Of particular salience to the value conflict in the
postconviction DNA debate are what Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin call "moral
taxonomies." See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 20, at 14 ("One indispensable instrument
for helping to resolve moral problems in practice, therefore, is a detailed and methodical map
of morally significant likenesses and differences: what may be called a moral taxonomy.").
77 Categories may be defined formally or constituted through narrative. See AMSTERDAM
& BRUNER, supra note 69, at 32 ("These, then, are the main sources from which category
systems are drawn: the natural theoretical, the human narrative, and the super-natural
religious.").
78 I use "inference by analogy" in the same sense that Jonsen & Toulmin refer to
"arguing from analogy" in clinical diagnostic arguments. See JONSEN & TOuLMIN, supra
note 20, at 41 (emphasis in original omitted). My broad use of "analogy" here would also
include much of what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call argumentation by example,
illustration, and model. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 350-98.
79 Prototypes derive their salience from their ability to capture the nature of the discourse
that produces them. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 69, at 41 ("We tend toward the
view that prototypes are somewhat like tropes: they function tropo-logically to capture the
nature of the system from which a set of categories emerges or is derived.").
80 Categorization based on definition and history would be characteristic of formal and
narrative logos respectively. Though I recognize the potential for confusion in my naming
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reasoning of casuistry8 and precedent in common law.82 Categorical logos
also concerns conclusions about relevance and what renders analogies
material in a discourse. 3
Figure 1
Prototypical Logos Characteristics
Formal Empirical Narrative Categorical
Premises ex concessis a posteriori historical familial
I
Inference deductive inductive moral analogical
I
Conclusion necessary probable preferable relevant
The prototypical characteristics of different argument logoi are
summarized in Figure 1 above. As I have stressed, the categories are not
intended as formal definitions dividing exclusive, natural, or transcendent
classes. Rather, I offer this taxonomy as a useful generalization concerning
the varying roles played by premises, inferences, and conclusions in
argument. Modes of proof and the reach of justification vary from
convention, I call categorization based on prototypical example categorical logos because I
think it is the most natural (prototypical) form of categorization. See AMSTERDAM &
BRUNER, supra note 69, at 50 (organizing "natural-kind" categories prototypically rather
than definitionally).
81 In their compelling work, Jonsen and Toulmin seek to reclaim and redeem casuistry as
a model for practical (as opposed to theoretical) thinking about ethical issues. See JONSEN &
TOULMIN, supra note 20, at 23-46. Initially, they compare moral reasoning to medical
diagnosis: "In moral as in medical practice, the resolution of practical problems draws on a
central taxonomy of type cases, and the pattern of argument by paradigm and analogy is
once again at work." Id. at 42. Later, they show that "common law" and "common
morality" share a casuistical ancestry. See id. at 403 n.29, 89-175.
82 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 781
("[Reasoning by analogy] may even be said to be the central feature of the common law
method ... ").
83 As with rules, standards, and narratives, the academic literature on analogy in law is
also extensive. For useful discussions, see generally LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON:
THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005); MACCORMICK, supra note 33, at 205-13;
Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1996).
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discourse to discourse depending on how premises are anchored, what kinds
of inferential leaps are made, and the modality of conclusions reached.84
III. ORIGINS AND INFLUENCE IN § 1983 POSTCONVICTION DNA ACCESS
DISCOURSE
With the basic contours of my conceptual framework established, I
now return to the data of this case study. In Part Ill(A), I tell two litigation
stories that lie at the earliest roots of the postconviction DNA access
discourse's genealogy-the tales of James Harvey and Bruce Godschalk.
In Part Ill(B), I take a first step in proving my argument that Judge Michael
Luttig's concurring opinion in Harvey H has exerted a singular rhetorical
influence over the postconviction DNA access debate by undertaking an
empirical review of citation patterns in all federal § 1983 DNA access cases
published after Harvey II. I maintain that the quantity and quality of cites
to Luttig provide prima facie evidence of his influence over the debate.
A. HARVEY AND GODSCHALK: TWIN STRANDS IN A DNA DEBATE
James Harvey and Bruce Godschalk both filed § 1983 complaints
seeking access to DNA evidence in 2000. The district court opinions in
Harvey and Godschalk are the first published decisions in this study's case
universe. 85 Both prisoners ultimately obtained DNA testing; 86 however, the
litigation paths that led to testing-and the post-litigation outcomes-differ
in critical respects.
James Harvey and a co-defendant were convicted of rape and forcible
sodomy on April 30, 1990 after a jury trial in Fairfax County, Virginia.87
At the time of conviction, forensic testing of smears and swabs taken from
the victim's rape kit revealed the presence of spermatozoa presumably
originating from the perpetrator(s) of the crime. 88 Using conventional
serological testing-commonly known as A-B-O blood typing-neither
84 Here I follow Stephen Toulmin's use of "modality." See TOULMIN, THE USES OF
ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at 17 (arguing that modal terms like "'possible', 'necessary' and
the like ... are best understood... by examining the functions they have when we come to
set out our arguments"). Toulmin usefully distinguishes between the "force" and "criteria"
of modal conclusions and maintains that the force of any modality is invariant across
argument fields but that the criteria for establishing modal conclusions are field-dependent.
See id. at 28-36; see also supra note 49 (discussing Toulmin's concept of argument field).
85 See Godschalk v. Montgomery County, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Harvey
v. Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Va. 2000). At least one other prisoner, Clyde Charles,
had filed a § 1983 DNA access action before Harvey or Godschalk, but this litigation ended
without a published decision. See infra note 97.
86 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.




Harvey nor his codefendant could be excluded as the source of this sperm
recovered from the victim.8 9 Harvey, however, maintained his innocence
and contended that DNA testing could prove it.
Bruce Godschalk was convicted of two rapes after a 1987 trial in
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.90 The prosecution's case turned on the
identification of Godschalk by one of the victims as well as on Godschalk's
own detailed audiotaped confession to the police. 91  In addition, the
prosecution introduced evidence that Godschalk's A-B-O blood type
matched that of the semen recovered from the first victim's rape kit.
92
Godschalk asserted that more accurate DNA testing of the semen evidence
from the rape kits could exonerate him.
After many years of unsuccessful attempts to secure testing,93 James
Harvey, in 2000, filed a § 1983 action in the Eastern District of Virginia
suing for access to the victim's rape kit evidence. 94 The district court first
denied a motion to dismiss by the State95 and then granted summary
judgment to Harvey.96 In the first decision of its kind,97 the court found that
89 Id. The discriminating power of A-B-O blood typing is comparatively weak. See Dale
D. Dykes, The Use of Frequency Tables in Parentage Testing, in PROBABILITY OF INCLUSION
IN PATERNITY TESTING 15, 20, 29 (Herbert Silver et al. eds., 1982) (40% of the Caucasian
population is type A, 11% type B, 45% type 0, and 4% type AB). This pales in comparison
to STR DNA testing, which can generate "likelihood ratios" or "random match probabilities"
that are effectively unique in the human population. See supra note 68.
90 See Godschalk, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
91 Id. at 367-69. Godschalk unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confession at his trial.
Id. at 367-68.
92 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 12, at 548-49.
93 Harvey first sought testing through federal litigation in 1994. See Harvey, 119 F.
Supp. 2d at 582. Through counsel, he also sought testing on consent of the Fairfax Country
Commonwealth Attorney's office. Id
94 id.
" Harvey, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 584. Defendant was Robert Horan, Jr., the
Commonwealth's attorney for Fairfax County. Although not so phrased, Horan had sought
dismissal on Preiser-Heck grounds, arguing that Harvey's § 1983 petition was a collateral
attack on conviction properly brought as a writ for habeas corpus. Id. Of course, the Harvey
I court reversed the district court precisely on Preiser-Heck grounds. See infra notes 104-07
and accompanying text.
96 Harvey v. Horan, No. 00-1123-A, 2001 WL 419142, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2001).
97 At least one prisoner, Clyde Charles, had successfully litigated a § 1983 DNA access
action prior to the Harvey district court decision, which ultimately led to the prosecutor
consenting to DNA testing and Charles' total exoneration. See Charles v. Greenberg,
No. 00-958, 2000 WL 1838713, *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2000) (post-exoneration civil
litigation that refers to previous § 1983 DNA access litigation). However, no decision from
the Charles DNA access litigation is published or available on Westlaw. Id. Interestingly, in
his summary judgment decision in Harvey, Judge Bryan actually cited to the Charles court
as having previously noted a "constitutional basis for access to biological evidence."
Harvey, 2001 WL 419142, at *5 (citing Charles, 2000 WL 1838713, at *3). However, in
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"pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, the plaintiff has a due process right of
access to the DNA evidence ... , as such evidence could constitute material
exculpatory evidence." 98 The State appealed this decision.99
Like Harvey, Bruce Godschalk was also unsuccessful in his initial
attempts to secure DNA testing through state courts.100 Godschalk also
petitioned a federal court in 2000 for relief under § 1983.101 On summary
judgment, the district court also cited to Brady v. Maryland as well as to the
Harvey decisions and similarly found that Godschalk had a "due process
right of access to the genetic material for the limited purpose of DNA
testing."'10 2  However, unlike in the Harvey proceedings, the State in
Godschalk did not pursue an appeal. 10 3 Before turning to the results of
Godschalk's DNA tests, then, the remainder of the Harvey litigation story
needs to be told.
In a case now known as Harvey I, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed the
lower court judgment in James Harvey's case.' 0 4 Writing for the majority,
Chief Judge Harvie Wilkinson noted that "Harvey is seeking access for one
reason and one reason only-as the first step to undermine his
conviction. '1 5 Harvey's § 1983 action thus amounted to "a situation where
a criminal defendant seeks injunctive relief that necessarily implies the
invalidity of his conviction.' 10 6  This violated the Supreme Court's
admonition from Heck v. Humphrey that "a convicted criminal defendant
cannot bring a § 1983 action that would 'necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence."",107 (The competing arguments over this precise
that Charles decision, Judge Berrigan was actually citing the earlier Harvey decision on the
motion to dismiss. See Charles, 2000 WL 1838713, at *3 n.12 (citing Harvey, 119 F. Supp.
2d at 581). In other words, the Charles court cited Harvey as establishing the right, and then
the Harvey court cited the Charles court as establishing the right. These circular attributions
indicate reluctance to be viewed as creating a new right out of whole cloth. The circularity is
also evidence of a paradigm-level argument. See infra note 247 (discussing the role of
circularity in paradigm debates).
9' Harvey, 2001 WL 419142, at *5 (citation omitted) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963)).
99 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002).
100 See Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
101 See Godschalk v. Montgomery County, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 366-67 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Godschalk sued both the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office and the District
Attorney, Bruce L. Castor.
102 See id. at 368-70.
103 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 12, at 550 n. 11.
104 Harvey 1, 278 F.3d at 381.
105 Id. at 375.
116 Id. at 375 (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1997)).
107 Id. at 374 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). In addition to
finding a Heck bar, Wilkinson also noted that Harvey had no underlying constitutional right
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question-whether Heck v. Humphrey should bar § 1983 DNA access
actions-constitute the primary focus of Parts IV-V of this Article).
At the time Harvey filed his § 1983 action, Virginia had no state
statute providing a mechanism for prisoners to apply for postconviction
DNA testing. However, such legislation coincidentally came into effect in
Virginia during Harvey's federal litigation. 10 8 Leaving no stone unturned,
Harvey both petitioned for rehearing en banc in federal court after Harvey I
and also filed a postconviction DNA application in state court under the
new law. On March 1, 2002, the state court ordered Virginia's Division of
Forensic Science to test the DNA obtained from Harvey, Harvey's
codefendant, and the victim.'
109
With the DNA testing issue rendered moot, the Fourth Circuit denied
Harvey's petition for rehearing en banc on March 28, 2002 in a case known
as Harvey 11.110 Even though he agreed that the testing issue was moot, in
Harvey II, Judge Michael Luttig nonetheless proffered an extensive opinion
arguing Harvey I was incorrectly decided. 1' This provoked Chief Judge
Harvie Wilkinson III to respond with a spirited defense of his Harvey I
opinion. 12
When the litigation ended in both Godschalk's and Harvey's cases,
DNA testing proceeded. In February 2002, DNA tests demonstrated that a
single rapist had committed both Montgomery County rapes and that Bruce
Godschalk was absolutely excluded as being that assailant. 1 3 After fifteen
years of wrongful incarceration, Godschalk was fully exonerated.' 14 On the
other hand, when James Harvey finally got his DNA test in October 2002,
the results included Harvey as a potential source of sperm recovered from
of access. Id. at 378-80 & n.3. The lack of a constitutional right formed the basis for a
concurrence by Judge Robert King. Harvey 1, 278 F.3d at 381-88 (rejecting majority's Heck
ruling but finding that no right of access existed under Brady v. Maryland) (King, J.,
concurring).
10s See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (West 2008) (effective May 2, 2001).
109 See Harvey v. Warden of Coffeewood Corr. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 58, 59 (Va. 2004).
110 Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 285 F.3d 298, 298 (4th Cir. 2002).
i. See id. at 304-26 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
112 See id. at 298-304 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and rehearing
en banc). The conflicting opinions of Luttig and Wilkinson provide the primary texts for
analyzing the competing logoi of the Preiser-Heck debate in the following Parts of this
Article. See infra Part IV.A-B.
113 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 12, at 550; see also Sara Rimer, Convict's DNA
Sways Labs, Not a Determined Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2002, at A14.
114 Seeid.
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the victim." 15 In plainer terms, DNA effectively confirmed Harvey's actual
guilt of the rape for which he was convicted." 
6
While Godschalk's victory seems unassailably complete, the curious
tale of James Harvey dramatically demonstrates the discourse-dependent
nature of assessing what it means to win legal arguments. We might ask:
Did Harvey win or lose his legal argument? 1 7  Certainly, the simple
conclusion that Harvey lost because the DNA included him would
improperly obscure his legacy of providing the impetus behind the single
most influential case in the § 1983 DNA access discourse.
Though Bruce Godschalk's personal victory undoubtedly inspired
wrongfully convicted prisoners and their attorneys to file subsequent § 1983
access actions," 8 my claim is that no case in the closed universe of this
study has influenced the reasoning of other courts participating in the
discourse as much as Harvey. 19  The unequalled pull of Harvey-and
115 See Josh White, DNA Tests Confirm Conviction of Rapist; Inmate Claimed Innocence
in '89 Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2002, at T1.
116 Postconviction DNA testing that confirms guilt is a lesser known but certainly
significant phenomenon. See generally Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 3, at 71-72
(2008) (describing a "DNA confirmation group" of sixty-three individuals who had been
inculpated by postconviction DNA testing). Professor Garrett notes the scarcity of
information concerning DNA confirmation cases: "District attorneys often do not publicize
such results, and the news media provide less coverage of inculpations than they do of
exonerations. After all, inculpatory test results merely confirm the jury verdict." Id. at 72.
In our universe of § 1983 DNA access actions, DNA testing also inculpated Robert Breest.
See News Release, N.H. Dep't of Justice, State v. Robert Breest: DNA Test Results in 1971
Concord Homicide, (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.doj.state.nh.us/publications/
nreleases2008/032708breest.html. In addition, Danny Joe Bradley was included on some
DNA evidence in the early stages of § 1983 litigation aimed to uncover other potentially
exculpatory evidence. See Bradley v. King, 56 F.3d 1225 (11 th Cir. 2009).
117 Harvey "won" in federal district court, "lost" in the federal circuit court, and then
"won" in state court at the trial level. This state court victory mooted his federal appeal but
also subsequently destroyed his innocence claim.
118 Godschalk's story almost certainly helped the Pennsylvania legislature pass its
postconviction DNA testing law. See Annie Parnes, Schweiker Signs Law Letting Convicts
Seek DNA Testing, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 11, 2002, at B 1 (noting passage of Pennsylvania's
postconviction DNA statute and citing to Godschalk's exoneration five months earlier).
From my own experience litigating § 1983 DNA access cases at the Innocence Project, I can
attest that Godschalk's success and Kreimer and Rudovsky's article about potential sources
for the existence of a postconviction right were very influential among advocates. See
generally Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 12.
119 Thus, I am not claiming that the Harvey cases are more influential than U.S. Supreme
Court cases around which the DNA debate revolves. These cases are part of a larger
discourse not included in our closed universe of federal cases addressing § 1983 DNA access
actions. Of course, I readily concede that the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Heck v.
Humphrey (and related cases) have had more weight over the Heck debate than any
argument advanced by Luttig or Wilkinson in Harvey 11. Furthermore, I fully expect that
after the Supreme Court decides Osborne, that decision will instantly redefine the § 1983
2009] 1069
COLIN STARGER
especially of Judge Michael Luttig's concurring opinion in Harvey I-can
be illustrated by an empirical review of citation patterns in opinions from
this Article's case study.
B. JUDGE LUTTIG'S INFLUENCE: A PRIMA FACIE CASE
After Harvey 11, federal courts issued thirty-one opinions in cases
involving nineteen different individuals. 120 The Harvey litigation was cited
in all but five of these nineteen controversies.121  Of these five apparent
exceptions, all but one occurred in relatively recent litigation controlled by
a previous decision in the circuit that had itself cited Harvey.'22 In other
words, where the question was one of first impression, courts almost
invariably looked to Harvey.' 
23
DNA access discourse. My observations thus concern the dynamics of persuasion before the
rhetorical nine hundred pound gorilla enters the conversation.
120 See supra note 18. Of course, the time frame for this claim is also bounded by the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Osborne on November 3, 2008. See supra note 1.
121 Harvey cites appear in eighteen decisions from actions involving fourteen different
individuals. See, e.g., McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 106-08 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding
case to district court with instructions to follow Luttig's due process framework); Savory v.
Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Harvey I and Harvey 11); Grayson v. King,
460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (carefully distinguishing plaintiffs case from due
process analysis described by Luttig); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050,
1054-55 (9th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with Luttig's analysis); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287,
1291 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (stating agreement with Luttig); Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303
F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (describing Harvey I as "strongly persuasive"); McDaniel v.
Suthers, No. 08-00223, 2008 WL 4527697, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Harvey
debate); Breest v. New Hampshire, No. 06-361, 2008 WL 183240, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 18,
2008) (citing debate between "highly respected judges" in Harvey 11); Gilkey v. Livingston,
Nos. 3:06-1903, 3:06-1904, 3:06-1905, 2007 WL 1953456, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2007)
(calling Harvey I "strongly persuasive"); Harrison v. Dumanis, No. 06-2470, 2007
WL 1159976, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (citing Ninth Circuit's analysis of Luttig);
Smith v. Worthy, 4:07-10243, 2007 WL 295007, at *1 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 29, 2007) (citing
Harvey 1); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244-49 (D. Mass. 2006) (relying heavily on
Luttig); Alley v. Key, 431 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799-802 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (acknowledging
plaintiffs repeated cites to Luttig); Moore v. Lockyer, No. 04-1952, 2005 WL 2334350, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005) (describing Luttig's opinion as "undoubtedly correct"); see
also infra note 124 (listing additional decisions quoting Luttig in controversies cited above).
122 These non-first-impression rulings are from 2007 or 2008. Three of them followed
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Grayson and one followed the Second Circuit's decision in
McKithen. See, e.g., Arthur v. King, No. 2:07-319, 2007 WL 2381992, at *6-8 (M.D. Ala.
Aug. 2007) (following direct authority of Grayson); Thompson v. McCollum, 253 F. App'x
11, 13 (11 th Cir. 2007); Wambolt v. Chittendon County, No. 2:07-167, 2008 WL 682588, at
* 1-2 (D. Vt. Mar. 7, 2008) (following direct authority of McKithen); Morgan v. Satz, No. 08-
80379, 2008 WL 2694745, at *34 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008) (following direct authority of
Grayson).
123 The single controversy apparently untouched by Harvey is represented by the Sixth
Circuit's unpublished decision in Boyle v. Maher. See 46 F. App'x 340 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Even more impressive is the fact that Judge Luttig's Harvey I
concurrence was explicitly cited in fourteen decisions originating from
eleven different individuals' § 1983 DNA access actions. 24 Again, these
numbers must be placed in the context of the thirty-one decisions emerging
from nineteen individual controversies after Harvey II and where only
fourteen actions involved courts reaching procedural or constitutional
questions as issues of first impression.1 25 Most dramatically, in the eight
controversies after Harvey II where courts reached the constitutional
question as one of first impression, Luttig's constitutional analysis was
cited in every case.126 No other case from within the postconviction DNA
discourse posts anywhere near these kinds of numbers.'
27
However, as explained in infra note 266, Boyle truly is an outlier as its precedent was
blatantly ignored by a district court within the Sixth Circuit.
124 In addition to the eleven cases citing Luttig in supra note 121, Luttig has been
repeatedly cited throughout the course of the Osborne and McKithen litigation. See Osborne
v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008); McKithen v. Brown, 565 F.
Supp. 2d 440, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d
1079, 1081 (D. Alaska 2006). Given Luttig's prominence in the Osborne litigation at the
district and appellate levels, his opinion has also played heavily in the advocates' briefs
currently before the Supreme Court. See Osborne Respondent's Brief, supra note 1, at 4-43
(repeatedly citing Luttig); Brief for Petitioners at 53, Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129
S. Ct. 2308 (2008) (citing Luttig's opinion in Harvey I1).
125 See supra notes 121-22.
126 The eight post-Harvey H controversies that reached the constitutional question as one
of first impression are (in chronological order): Moore v. Lockyer, No. 04-1952, 2005
WL 2334350, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005) (describing Luttig's opinion as "undoubtedly
correct" but denying relief on estoppel grounds), aff'd 2008 WL 4430338 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
2008); Alley v. Key, 431 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799-802 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (acknowledging
plaintiffs repeated cites to Luttig but denying existence of right), aff'd 2006 WL 1313364
(6th Cir. May 14, 2006); Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081 (D.
Alaska 2006) (siding with Luttig's "particularly persuasive" constitutional analysis), aff'd
521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (also citing Luttig), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (Nov. 3,
2008) (No. 08-6); Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no
constitutional right but also agreeing with Luttig); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244-
49 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding right and relying heavily on Luttig); Harrison v. Dumanis,
No. 06-2470, 2007 WL 1159976, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (finding no fight for
plaintiff but distinguishing district court in Osborne and citing Luttig); Breest v. New
Hampshire, No. 06-361, 2008 WL 183240, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 18, 2008) (finding right and
citing Luttig); McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 456-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding
right and repeatedly citing Luttig).
127 The second most cited opinion from within the discourse is Godschalk, which has
been cited in seven decisions, each from a different individual's action. See Osborne v. Dist.
Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008); Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328,
1339 n.9 (11 th Cir. 2006); McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2008);
Breest v. New Hampshire Atty. Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.N.H. 2007); Wade v.
Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D. Mass. 2006); Alley v. Key, 431 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798
n.3 (W.D. Tenn. 2006); Moore v. Lockyer, No. 04-1952, 2005 WL 2334350, at *8 (N.D.
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Skeptics might object that these statistics inherently reflect nothing
other than the fact that the Harvey litigation produced the first decision
from a federal appeals court in a § 1983 DNA access action. On this
contrary account, the ubiquitous Harvey cites support no inference about
Harvey's persuasive effect on the discourse at all-the multiple references
represent only subsequent courts' formal recitation of relevant authority. 28
While it is certainly true that mere citation is not conclusive evidence of
rhetorical influence, I offer two considerations to support my claim
regarding Luttig's sway on the debate.
First, the quality of citations bolsters the quantitative claim to
prominence of Luttig's Harvey II opinion. 129 Courts have devoted
considerable ink to analyzing various facets of Luttig's opinion, which they
have praised as "undoubtedly correct," 130 "particularly persuasive,"'' 31 and
"penetrating and insightful.' 32 Even when courts have not followed Luttig,
they tend to engage with his analysis rather than simply dismiss it. 1
33
Second, the high number of Luttig references comes despite the fact
that his opinion is nothing but exhortative obiter dicta. His concurrence
technically presents no challenge to the contrary and controlling authority
of Harvey L134 Subsequent courts thus had no precedent-based reason to
Cal. Sept. 23, 2005). Again, I emphasize my claim about influence is restricted to cases
from within § 1983 DNA discourse. See supra note 119.
128 From this perspective, it is as if courts were merely "showing their work" by citing to
the Harvey cases. They collected texts but were not influenced in their deliberations by
those texts.
129 1 might have strengthened the quantitative case on its own terms had I counted the
number of separate citations to Luttig and Harvey. For example, one judge included Luttig's
name fifteen separate times in an opinion. See McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440,
456-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). However, some courts made far more fleeting references to
Harvey. See, e.g., Smith v. Worthy, No. 4:07-10243, 2007 WL 295007, at *1 (E.D. Mich.,
Jan. 29, 2007). In the end, rather than devise a system to weigh the number of citations and
their importance, I limit the reach of my quantitative claim to making only a prima facie
case.
130 Moore, 2005 WL 2334350, at *8.
131 Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081 (D. Alaska 2006).
132 McKithen, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 477 n.43. Although Judge Gleeson is actually
disagreeing with Luttig here, the rest of his opinion repeatedly follows Luttig's cues and
reaches the same conclusions. See, e.g., id at 458.
133 See, e.g., Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006); Alley v. Key, 431
F. Supp. 2d 790, 800-02 (W.D. Tenn. 2006). The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Grayson is
particularly dramatic in this regard in that while it declined to find that plaintiff had a right of
access, it specifically explained that "Grayson's case does not fall within the limited class of
cases described by [Luttig's] Harvey concurrence in the denial of rehearing." Id.
134 Luttig himself would not challenge this conclusion. See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d
520, 538 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J., dissenting). In Jones, Luttig criticized the majority's
reliance on an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, and noted that "these
kinds of revisionist writings cannot be and are not the binding authority of the circuit." Id.
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recite Luttig's opinion, and yet cite him they did. The repeated invocation
of Luttig despite this formal irrelevance suggests that his reasoning played
some role in judicial deliberations in the § 1983 DNA access conversation.
From this discussion, I hope it is clear that my own claim concerning
Luttig's influence is not an exacting empirical one. I do not pretend to have
proved a strict causal relationship between Luttig's opinion and the
outcomes in subsequent cases. Nor do I suggest that I have precisely
quantified the measure of Luttig's discursive influence.135 Rather, I present
a prima facie case for Luttig's mark upon the debate that justifies further
attention to his opinion. I suggest that Judge Luttig's opinion, and that of
his foil, Chief Judge Wilkinson, capture essential competing logoi of the
§ 1983 DNA access controversy.
IV. RHETORIC AND LOGOS: LUTTIG V. WILKINSON IN HARVEYH
The Harvey II opinions of Chief Judge Harvie Wilkinson III and Judge
Michael Luttig represent competing rhetorical poles of the § 1983 DNA
access debate. Both ostensibly concurring Harvey H jurists agreed that en
banc rehearing was irrelevant since James Harvey had found relief in state
court.
13 6 Nonetheless, the judges authored two opinions that sprawled over
twenty-eight pages of the Federal Reporter.137  Judge Michael Luttig
instigated the procedurally irrelevant argument with his twenty-two-page
missive detailing why he thought Harvey I was incorrectly decided.' 38 This
(emphasis in original omitted). Although Luttig directs his criticism at concurrences that
seek to correct or clarify apparent errors in the original panel opinions (as Chief Judge
Wilkinson might be accused of doing in his Harvey H concurrence), his observation about
the lack of any binding authority clearly applies to his own Harvey H opinion.
135 My intuition here is actually that the operative dynamics of persuasion could never be
neatly reduced to numbers and calculations-a prerequisite to successful empirical
induction.
136 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 11), 285 F.3d 298, 298 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) (". . the [Harvey I] panel opinion
suggested that the state courts could order DNA testing .... And that is precisely what the
state courts have now done."); id. at 304 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc)
("I concur in the court's judgment to deny rehearing of this case en banc ... because it
appears that appellee Harvey will, pursuant to state court order entered after our panel's
decision, be afforded the chance [to conduct DNA testing].").
117 See Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 298-326.
138 See id. at 304 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) ("So believing, and
having no other opportunity to express my views on these important questions-the panel
opinion now constituting the law of our Circuit-I set forth those views herein.").
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provoked a "puzzled" Chief Judge Wilkinson to pen his six-page response
ardently defending Harvey L 1
39
A. RHETORICAL PRESENTATION IN HARVEYII
1. Judge Luttig's Opinion
Luttig approached his Harvey H opinion with careful attention to form,
neatly arranging his twenty-two-page concurrence into Roman numeral
parts with lettered subparts. 140 He organized his argument so that a general
discussion of first principles preceded specific investigation into doctrine.
This was followed by meticulous doctrinal analysis, refutation of potential
objections, and then a conclusion.
141
Luttig's main framing principle was an appeal to the extraordinary
power of DNA tests as forensic proof. Hailing the "scientific advances in
the testing of deoxyribonucleic acid, particularly Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) DNA testing,"'142 he observed:
There is now widespread agreement within the scientific community that this
technology, which requires literally cellular-size samples only, can distinguish
between any two individuals on the planet, other than identical twins, the statistical
probabilities of STR DNA matches ranging in the hundreds of billions, if not trillions.
In other words, STR DNA tests can, in certain circumstances, establish to a virtual
certainty whether a given individual did or did not commit a particular crime.' 43
This new possibility of "objective proof' in criminal adjudication is
"the evidentiary equivalent of 'watershed' rules of constitutional law."'
' 44
131 See id at 298 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and rehearing en
bane) ("However, inasmuch as my colleague has undertaken an extended discussion of his
own, I tender this brief response.").
140 The opinion actually opens with a two paragraph introduction explaining why he
concurred in denying rehearing despite his disagreement with Harvey 1. Harvey II, 285 F.3d
at 304 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en bane). Part I undertakes an exposition on
DNA science and its impact on proof in law. Id. at 304-06. Part II systematically addresses
the Heck question (in Subpart A), the existence-of-a-constitutional-right question (in Subpart
B), and then engages in rebuttal (Subparts C-D). Id. at 306-25. Part III provides a brief
restatement of his conclusion. Id. at 325-26.
141 In this structure, Luttig perfectly follows a classical rhetorical arrangement. See
CORBErF & CONNORS, supra note 46, at 256-92 (detailing schema of arrangement "that the
Greeks called taxis and the Latins called dispositio."). The two paragraph opener and Part I
work together as exordium (introduction) and narratio (statement of relevant facts). Parts
II.A-B constitute the confirmatio (proof of case). Finally, Parts II.C-D engage in refutation
(discrediting opposing views) and Part III is the peroratio (conclusion).
142 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 304 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
143 Id. at 305.
144 See id. at 306 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). Luttig places the DNA's
objective power in the context of "our system of justice which, while insisting upon a very
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Given the "law's foundational concern for the determination of guilt and
innocence," Luttig urged "judicial recognition of this new science.' 45
Anticipating competing first principles, Luttig acknowledged both the
"presumption of correctness rightly enjoyed by final judgments of
conviction and the separate, indisputable interest in the finality of such
judgments."' 146  However, he answered that prohibiting access to DNA
where forensic testing "can definitely establish innocence ... is simply to
confer a sanctity upon finality that not even that concededly substantial
interest deserves."'
147
In this introductory section, Luttig effectively created an interpretative
lens through which his subsequent doctrinal analysis is seen. He did this by
first associating his position with paradigm-changing DNA technology and
the objective ethos of scientific progress.' 48  More normatively, he also
anchored his argument in what Chaim Perelman would call a "hierarchy of
values."' 149  Luttig identified two foundational values-let us call them
"accuracy" and "finality"-as both vital to the criminal justice system; he
high degree of proof for conviction, does not, after all, require proof beyond all doubt, and
therefore is capable of producing erroneous determinations of both guilt and innocence." Id.
141 Id. at 306.
146 Id.
147 i.
148 As one commentator has observed, DNA and DNA technology "legitimate[] legal
decisions in a completely new way, a way that is identified with science .... DNA testing
derives its power as 'a gold standard for truth telling' from its scientific ethos." JENNIFER L.
CULBERT, DEAD CERTAINTY: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT 118
(2008) (emphasis added) (quoting JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED 121-22 (2000)). Though he trades in science's ethos, at one point Luttig veers
into pathos. He states that "current techniques [of STR testing] can often yield results from
even a single cell." Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 305 & n. 1 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of
rehearing en banc) (citing I. Findlay et al., DNA Fingerprinting from Single Cells, 389
NATURE 555 (1997)). Unfortunately, the study Luttig cites to justify his single-cell-testing
proposition did not involve "current techniques" of forensic DNA testing, but rather an
experimental method for DNA typing undertaken in a highly controlled laboratory setting.
See id. at 555. In the forensic context, obtaining reliable results is extremely tricky when
less than one hundred picograms of DNA are present (approximately seventeen cells' worth)
because of the ease of contamination and stochastic effects of the PCR amplification process.
See BUTLER, supra note 65, at 68, 168-70. Then current techniques of forensic DNA testing
could not obtain reliable results from a single cell.
149 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21 at 80-83. For Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, argument begins with the consideration of "what sort of agreement can
serve as premises." Id. at 66. Hierarchies (along with values themselves and other loci) are
objects of agreement based on the "preferable", as opposed to facts, truths, and presumptions
which are objects of agreement based on the "real." Id. The hierarchy of "accuracy" over
"finality" would constitute a heterogeneous hierarchy akin to a hierarchy promoting the
"true" over the "good." See id. at 81. Value hierarchies play an essential role in "starting
point of argumentation" because they allow for choices when values conflict. Id. at 81-82.
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then urged that accuracy should always trump finality in the value hierarchy
where science could unequivocally establish innocence. 
150
From this starting point, Luttig took on the "threshold question of
whether the assertion of such a right of access is a direct challenge to one's
conviction or, instead, an independent constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."' Here Luttig confronted the primary holding of the Harvey I
majority, which had found James Harvey's § 1983 action barred by the
Supreme Court decisions in the Heck v. Humphrey family of cases. 152 In
Harvey I, the court found James Harvey's § 1983 action barred, concluding
that federal habeas corpus provided the sole remedy for a constitutional
action seeking DNA testing to prove innocence. 1
53
Luttig's attack on Harvey I was brief, direct, and self-contained. He
began by identifying a single rule from "applicable Supreme Court
precedent" that controlled the inquiry.154 This is the so-called Heck rule,
which bars any § 1983 action that 'necessarily implies' the invalidity of [a
prisoner's] conviction or sentence."' 155 Luttig carefully explained the rule as
marking a bright line between habeas and § 1983: if Harvey's action
"necessarily implies" his conviction's invalidity, then it "must be
adjudicated in habeas"; "on the other hand, if [it] does not 'necessarily
imply' his conviction's invalidity but "is properly understood as
independent of any attack on the underlying conviction," then a § 1983
claim does indeed lie.'
56
With this decision rule established, Luttig then asserted that permitting
access to STR DNA testing "necessarily implies nothing at all about the
plaintiff's conviction." 157 This is because:
150 This value hierarchy placing accuracy over finality may also be thought of as a stating
a "moral taxonomy." See supra note 76 (discussing Jonsen's and Toulmin's concept of
moral taxonomy).
'' Harvey If, 285 F.3d at 307 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
152 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 374-78 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing, inter
alia, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994);
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981));
see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
"' Harvey 1, 278 F.3d at 378 ("Under Preiser and Hamlin, Harvey's sole federal remedy
is a writ of habeas corpus."). The majority then treated the action as sounding in habeas, and
dismissed it "as a successive petition brought without leave of court." Id. at 379.
1' Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 307 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
155 Id.
156 Id. Interestingly, in this opening description of the Heck rule, Luttig does not
immediately cite Heck. Rather, he describes the "necessarily implies" rule in painstaking
detail before he finally cites to the portion of Harvey I, which in turn quotes Heck. See id.
This approach comports with his general strategy of relentless focus to make the "necessarily
implies" inquiry the only one that controls.
151 Id. at 308.
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The results of any DNA tests that are eventually performed may be inconclusive, they
may be insufficiently exculpatory, or they may even be inculpatory. That these
scientific possibilities exist, in and of itself, suffices to establish that the asserted right
of mere access is not a direct, or for that matter even an indirect, attack on one's
conviction or sentence.158
From here, Luttig quickly concluded that Harvey's § 1983 access action
was cognizable "on the direct authority of Heck, which properly was
actually a quite narrow decision."' 59
The remainder of the argument in this section sought to justify Luttig's
narrow reading of Heck. First, Luttig pointed out how Harvey's asserted
right of access is "wholly unlike the claims in Heck for an assertedly illegal
investigation and arrest., 160  This difference rests on the possibility that
victory in Harvey's § 1983 action "may even prove the defendant's guilt
beyond any question."' 161 Second, Luttig carefully parsed two of Heck's
footnotes where the Court provided hypothetical examples of permissible
and impermissible actions under its new rule.162 From this close study,
Luttig asserted that the "conclusion is inescapable" that Harvey's action
does not "in any respect impl[y] the invalidity of [his] conviction."
'163
Having thus disposed of this procedural issue, Luttig dove headlong
into substantive waters with a zealous argument in favor of finding a
constitutional postconviction right of access to DNA evidence. 64 In form
and content, Luttig treated the Heck and constitutional arguments as
logically distinct and subject to entirely separate analyses. As explored
below, Wilkinson contested the practical severability of these arguments
(though not in explicit terms). 165 While not endorsing his view, I will take
Luttig at his word and so will not explore his constitutional arguments as I
more closely parse the dynamics of the Heck debate.
2. Chief Judge Wilkinson's Opinion
Chief Judge Wilkinson's six-page "brief response" to Luttig is also





162 Id. at 308-09 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.6, 487 n.7) (1994).
163 Id. at 309. Luttig also attacks the reasoning of the Harvey 1 opinion as internally
inconsistent. See id. at 309-10 (citing Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 376 (4th
Cir. 2002)).
'64 See id. at 310-26.
165 See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
166 Like Luttig, Wilkinson also opens his concurring opinion with a two paragraph
introduction that precedes the first lettered part. See Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 298 (Wilkinson,
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began his opinion with a statement of framing principles that set up his
subsequent analysis. However, in Harvey II, Wilkinson made less of an
affirmative case for his position-a task undertaken more in Harvey I 67-
and focused more on attacking and parrying Luttig's various arguments.
Wilkinson's own analysis proceeded from two starting points. First,
he maintained that "[t]here is no doubt that Harvey should receive the
biological evidence in this case" and emphasized that this "is precisely what
the state courts have now done.' ' 168 The success of state court based action
in James Harvey's case is intimately connected with Wilkinson's second
framing principle-"that claims of innocence should be entertained ... in
the first instance by the court, or at least by the court system, that initially
heard the case. 169 Wilkinson labeled his guiding concern "the morality of
process, ' 7 and he rejected the institutional competence of the federal
courts to entertain an issue so intertwined with state criminal procedure.
171
Although he offered a spirited defense of finality in Harvey J,172 in
Harvey II Wilkinson avoided portraying the conflict as one between
accuracy and finality. He conceded that the "American justice system
rightly sets the ascertainment of truth and the protection of innocence as its
C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc). Part I of Wilkinson's opinion
is divided into Subpart A (setting up Wilkinson's interpretive frame based on the lack of
institutional competence of the federal courts on this question) and Subpart B (asking a
series of questions designed to show how impractical Luttig's schema is). Id. at 299-301.
Part II details all of the then ongoing state legislative activity around provision of
postconviction DNA testing. Id. at 301-03. Part III attacks Luttig's reasoning on Heck. Id.
at 303-04. Finally, Part IV briefly restates his conclusion. Id. at 304.
167 Wilkinson wrote the majority opinion in Harvey L See supra notes 105-07 (quoting
Wilkinson's Harvey I opinion).
168 Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 298 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc).
169 Id. at 299.
170 See id. (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 123 (1975)).
171 See id. Although Wilkinson does not use the phrase "institutional competence,"
Alexander Bickel employed this concept in his critique of Warren Court activism in the
pages immediately preceding those cited by Wilkinson. See BICKEL, supra note 170, at 120
("More than once, and in some of its most important actions, the Warren Court got over
doctrinal difficulties or issues of the allocation of competences among various institutions by
asking what it viewed as a decisive practical question: If the Court did not take a certain
action which was right and good, would other institutions do so, given political realities?").
Wilkinson plainly charges Luttig with activism here. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 303
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) ("To be sure, the
displacement of elected officials by judicial authority always pleases some of the people
some of the time. But with activism, what goes around comes around.").
172 See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2002) ("While
finality is not the sole value in the criminal justice system, neither is it subject to the kind of
blunt abrogation that would occur with the recognition of a ... post-conviction [right of]
access to DNA evidence.").
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highest goals."'173 However, he averred, "[o]ur system ... does not allow
any person to press a claim of innocence at any time, at any place, and in
any manner." 174 For Wilkinson, "the presumption of legitimacy" of state
court convictions "would be lost if the court rendering the conviction could
simply be disregarded and bypassed at will, which is what Harvey sought to
do in fashioning his claim of innocence as a § 1983 suit.'
171
Having contested Luttig's framing of the issue, Wilkinson then
proceeded to attack the practical implications of finding a right of access.
He asked "a myriad of questions" about the parameters of Luttig's asserted
federal right.176 After expounding upon the difficulty inherent in having
federal courts manage DNA access, Wilkinson surveyed the legislative
activity in Congress and in the states to show how they were currently
handling the DNA issue. 77 He concluded this line of argument with an
upping of the rhetorical ante: "To constitutionalize this area, as the separate
opinion would, in the face of all this legislative activity and variation is to
evince nothing less than a loss of faith in democracy.
178
When Wilkinson finally turned to the specific procedural debate over
the propriety of Harvey's action under § 1983, he notably failed to engage
Luttig's line-by-line exegesis of Heck v. Humphrey. Rather, he recast the
debate as concerning the spirit of the law rather than its letter: "[T]he whole
point of Heck was to keep a state prisoner from challenging his conviction
in federal court in the first instance through an unexhausted habeas claim
masquerading as a § 1983 claim.',
179
From here, Wilkinson invoked the "basic place in Supreme Court
jurisprudence" of "the requirement that a state prisoner exhaust state
remedies before challenging his conviction in federal court."180  Since
171 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 299 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc).
174 id.
171 Id. at 300.
176 Id. Wilkinson actually asks nine different questions in the space of two pages. Id. at
300-01. These include questions about the standard for getting testing, whether the state
would have to pay for DNA, and what relief would follow from exculpatory results.
171 Id. at 302-03 (discussing the federal Innocence Protection Act as well as
postconviction DNA statutes from Virginia, New York, Florida, California, Maryland, and
North Carolina).
171 Id. at 303.
179 Id. Wilkinson also suggests here that Luttig's view runs counter to the spirit of the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Hamlin v. Warren and the Supreme Court's foundational Preiser
v. Rodriguez opinion. Id. ("The lesson of Hamlin and Preiser is that the state court should
have the first chance to review challenges to a state judgment of conviction.") (citing Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981)).
180 Id. at 303-04 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982)) (explaining that "[t]he
exhaustion doctrine existed long before its codification by Congress in 1948").
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Luttig's approach would apparently circumvent this exhaustion
requirement, Wilkinson characterized Luttig's reading of Heck as absurd:
"It is inconceivable that Heck meant to displace this long line of Supreme
Court precedent on the exhaustion requirement, or that it stands for the
proposition that claims such as Harvey's may proceed ab initio in federal
court."'
18 1
In his concluding paragraph, Wilkinson returned to the theme of
institutional competence. On his account, Harvey I "respects the proper
role of the federal courts" while Luttig's "separate opinion does just the
opposite ... disregard[ing] the roles of all the other actors in the American
system."' 182  Wilkinson closed by charging that Luttig's approach to
"determining the entitlements of individuals to the fruits of scientific
advances" treats "both state legislatures and state court systems as junior
partners with respect to their own trials and judgments."'
' 83
B. COMPETING LOGOI IN HAR VEYJI
Based on these readings, it is apparent that Luttig and Wilkinson
oriented their arguments to wholly different points of reference. Luttig
posed the question as concerning accuracy over finality in criminal justice.
Wilkinson characterized the same controversy as primarily implicating
institutional competence. The jurists all but talked past each other; though
engaged in the same fray, Luttig and Wilkinson defined the operative
discourse(s) differently.
This discursive disconnect involved distinct modes of proof. The
jurists reached opposite conclusions after starting from different premises.
This situation resulted in a category of debate like that between what
Thomas Kuhn has called "incommensurable" scientific paradigms. 184 Such
debates "cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or
mathematical proof' where "premises and rules of inference are stipulated
from the start."'' 8 5 In paradigm contests, the "debate is about premises, and
181 id. at 304.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 198-200 (3d ed.
1996). Kuhn's central concept of paradigm is complex, but notably includes the idea of a
constitutive framework in which debate occurs in particular communities. See, e.g., id. at 94
(describing paradigms as "modes of community life" and as circles bounding argument).
185 Id. at 199. In a strict logical or mathematical dispute, "if there is disagreement about
conclusions, the parties to the ensuing debate can retrace their steps one by one, checking
each against prior stipulation. At the end of that process, one or the other must concede that
he has made a mistake, violated a previously accepted rule." Id.
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its recourse is to persuasion as a prelude to the possibility of [logical or
mathematical] proof."
'1 86
While persuasion clearly functions differently in empirical science as
compared to law, 187 the same principles that make scientific arguments
persuasive-problem-solving ability, conceptual elegance, and overall
coherence' 88-also make legal arguments persuasive. The battle over
premises between Luttig and Wilkinson was a conflict between
incommensurable modes of proof; it was a conflict sounding in logos.
In Part II above, I distinguished four modes of logos-formal,
empirical, narrative, and categorical. The debate between Luttig and
Wilkinson involved a clash between formal and narrative modes of proof.
While Chief Judge Wilkinson justified classifying DNA access actions as
non-cognizable by elaborately plotting the narrative concerns of Preiser v.
Rodriguez and its progeny, Luttig framed his argument formally through the
deductive application of the rule from Heck.
Before further exploring these competing logoi, I pause briefly to
consider the background roles of empirical and categorical logics in the
debate. Initially, Wilkinson and Luttig both accepted the premise that
forensic DNA testing possesses the empirical power to prove guilt or
innocence definitively in certain classes of cases including James Harvey's
case. Thus, the facts that led to Harvey's conviction or the potential of
DNA testing to overcome the eyewitness testimony against him were not
contested at all. Though dealing with the consequences of DNA's
empirical power looms large, no actual contest over empirical logos
emerged in the dispute.
Similarly, categorical logos did not play a crucial role in the argument
either. While it is certainly true that Wilkinson and Luttig clashed over
whether Harvey's action falls within in a contested category-call it "Heck-
barred action," "Preiser-Heck inappropriate action," or "non-cognizable
§ 1983 action"'18 9 -both judges nonetheless agreed that the membership in
186 id.
187 Though Kuhn convincingly argues that values and persuasion play a role in scientific
debate, see id. at 93-95, 198-204, no offense should be taken at the suggestion that
persuasion in law is more political. Statutes literally codify politics and lawyers are
explicitly paid to persuade. Scientific inquiry is epistemologically distinct from legal
advocacy. See Susan Haack, What's Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in
Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1053, 1070-71 (2008).
188 See KUHN, supra note 184, at 153-57 (discussing considerations that persuade
scientific communities to accept new paradigms including the ability to solve crisis-
provoking problems and conceptual elegance).
189 I offer multiple formulations, because each one could be contested. Calling the
disputed category "Heck-barred action" validates Luttig's approach because it emphasizes
Heck to the exclusion of Preiser. Similarly, calling it "Preiser-Heck inappropriate" favors
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the category turns on interpretation of the cases in the Preiser-Heck line. In
other words, neither judge tried to analogize the issue to a different line of
controlling cases; the relevance of Preiser-Heck was an accepted premise.
Without conflict over relevance or analogy, no prototypical categorical
logos entered into the argument equation.
1. Luttig's Formal Logos
In describing Luttig's argument as formal, I refer specifically to his
Heck argument. Admittedly, Luttig's opening accuracy-versus-finality
trope was rooted in a narrative about the progress of science and the
fundamental values of our criminal justice system. 190 However, Luttig
presented the "threshold procedural question" as entirely severable from the
normative concerns of the constitutional debate.' 9' On this question, Luttig
actually maintained that it is "not even arguable" that the Heck rule permits
DNA actions to proceed under § 1983.192 From the outset, Luttig framed
his proof as logical demonstration rather than interpretative dispute.
Although he did not take this step himself, the formal structure of
Luttig's Heck argument means that it easily reduces to a syllogism:
Major Premise: All non-cognizable § 1983 actions necessarily imply the invalidity of
the underlying conviction.
Minor Premise:Harvey's § 1983 action does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his
underlying conviction.
Conclusion:Harvey's action is not a non-cognizable § 1983 action. 193
Wilkinson. "Non-cognizable § 1983 action" is more neutral as between Luttig and
Wilkinson, but potentially creates problems of its own. See infra note 193.
190 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
191 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting denial of rehearing en banc). Luttig earlier states that he "would prefer not to
have to address even the threshold, much less the fundamental constitutional, question." Id
at 307. However, in a tone of dutiful resignation, he concludes that because the procedural
question is easy, he must address the "difficult and delicate" constitutional question. Thus,
not only does Luttig frame the Heck question as logically prior to the constitutional one, he
also characterizes it as infinitely easier to resolve.
192 Id. at 308.
193 The reasoning described by this syllogism is set out in a single paragraph. See id.
Here, it should be noted that my category of "non-cognizable § 1983 action" could be
criticized as overinclusive. Other bars beyond Preiser-Heck may limit the practical
cognizability of § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Moore v. Brown, 295 F. App'x 176 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding DNA access action barred by collateral estoppel); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d
667, 672-74 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding DNA access action barred by statute of limitations).
However, because of the concerns outlined in supra note 189, I prefer this formulation than
one that refers directly to the contested doctrine.
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Assuming the truth of his premises, Luttig's conclusion here certainly
follows deductively. The rhetorical challenge, therefore, is to persuasively
establish the truth of his premises.
Consider first Luttig's major premise. Stephen Toulmin would call
this the "warrant" of Luttig's argument. 194 The "backing" for this warrant
obviously originated from the "necessarily implies" language of Heck.195
Though his argument turned on Heck's relevance to the classification of
non-cognizable § 1983 actions, Luttig proceeded as if Heck's undisputed
authority has already been established ex concessis. This move is certainly
defensible since the Harvey I majority had stated its conclusion in Heck's
terms.196 However, Luttig amplified this move through relentless narrowing
and focus. First, Luttig confined his doctrinal analysis to Heck alone.1
97
Then, he concentrated his interpretative inquiry on a single paragraph and
two associated footnotes.'98 Finally, he drew the "fault line" on a single
194 See TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at 87-99. In constructing his
argument model, Toulmin aimed to correct ambiguities in the syllogistic model of major
premise/minor premise/conclusion. See id. at 100-05. Toulmin explains that "major
premise" conflates into two distinct parts of an argument: (1) the "warrant" of an argument
which is its "rule", "principle," and "inference license"; and (2) a warrant's "backing" which
is the authority standing behind a warrant. See id. at 91, 95-96. I find the warrant/backing
distinction elegantly captures the difference between a proposed legal rule (warrant) and the
authority for the rule (backing). For a useful summary of Toulmin's model, see Kurt M.
Sanders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 3 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 166, 168-
72 (2006).
195 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). For an explanation of
"backing" and "warrant," see supra note 194.
196 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Heck as
primary authority and quoting Heck rule).
197 In this part of the opinion, Luttig cites only to one case besides Heck-Brady v.
Maryland. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc)
("[Access to DNA testing] certainly implies nothing more (and arguably a good deal less)
than... an assertion of [a] constitutional right to... exculpatory [evidence] ... under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [] (1963), which has never been thought necessarily to imply the
invalidity of the underlying conviction."). Luttig does not engage in any further analysis of
Brady here, nor does he even mention any other case in the Heck line.
198 See id.at 308-09 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.6, 487, n.7 (1994)).
Footnotes 6 and 7 in Heck provided prototypical examples of illicit and proper § 1983
actions by convicted criminals. Luttig analogizes the postconviction DNA access instance to
these Heck examples using what I call categorical logos. However, Luttig shows his
formalist stripes here when he states that "[t]he conclusion is inescapable from [Heck's]
examples (even if it were not from the reasoning of the opinion itself) that the claim of a
right of access [does not imply] the invalidity of the claimant's conviction." Id. Luttig thus
denies Heck's examples the badge of "reason." On my account, reasoning by example (or




word, necessity, and used italics to highlight the Supreme Court's own
"revealing italicization of the imperative" of necessity. 199
This bottom-line anchoring to necessity testifies to Luttig's formal
logos. He understood necessity as logical entailment. Thus, he established
his minor premise200-that Harvey's § 1983 action does not necessarily
imply his conviction's invalidity-by pointing to other "scientific
possibilities" that would not necessarily entail any threat to a conviction.
20 1
Such possibilities include DNA tests that return "inconclusive,"
"insufficiently exculpatory," or even "inculpatory" identification results.2 °2
Luttig did not consider the real-world probability of non-invalidating
outcomes to be relevant; their formal existence alone "suffices to establish
that the asserted right of mere access is not a direct, or ... even an indirect
attack on one's conviction or sentence. 2 3
2. Wilkinson's Narrative Logos
Chief Judge Wilkinson's response to Luttig moved in the opposite
rhetorical direction. Rather than sever and isolate the procedural question
from the constitutional debate and then winnow the Heck rule down to a
single word, Wilkinson folded Heck back into the context of the Preiser
line of cases, presented the procedural question as inextricably intertwined
with the substantive one, and linked the story of Harvey's successful bid for
DNA testing in state court to the "morality of process. 20 4 Wilkinson thus
employed a narrative logos to transform Luttig's mechanical rule
application into a morality play about the hubris of an activist federal judge.
Wilkinson's attention to narrative began with James Harvey's own tale
(as far as it had been written).20 5 Whereas Luttig all but excluded Harvey
from his formalistic inquiry into germane legal rules, 20 6 Wilkinson
199 Id.at 309.
200 Toulmin would call this the "data" for Luttig's argument. See TOULMIN, USES OF
ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at 90. In this case, though, the data also needs to be established
by preliminary argument-what geometers would call a lemma. See id.
201 Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
202 id.
203 id.
204 See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (analyzing Wilkinson's morality-of-
process framework).
205 See Harvey 1, 285 F.3d at 298 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc) (opening opinion by stating that "[t]here is no doubt that Harvey should
receive the biological evidence in this case for DNA testing").
206 Luttig does not even mention Harvey's name for the first three pages of his opinion;
on the fourth page, his brief reference comes only when quoting the Harvey I majority. See
id. at 303-06, 307 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc). The story behind
Harvey's struggle for DNA plays no role in Luttig's opinion.
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repeatedly returned to the equities of the controversy at issue. 20' He
immediately conceded that Harvey deserves DNA testing and found a moral
to the real world litigation story: "As Harvey's case shows, state courts, if
given a chance, can rise to their responsibilities. 2 °8 Wilkinson then placed
Harvey's successful bid for testing in the context of widespread state and
federal legislative activity aimed at providing access to postconviction
209DNA testing.
When it comes to § 1983 doctrine, Wilkinson explicitly related the
"threshold question posed by Harvey's § 1983 action ... to the nature of
the constitutional right he asserts., 210  The procedural issue was not
logically prior to the substantive one for Wilkinson because they share the
common theme of asserting innocence. On Wilkinson's view, the contested
"procedural right is the right to press and proclaim one's innocence in a
federal forum in the first instance when seeking access to DNA testing.
'2 11
By conjoining the procedural and substantive question, Wilkinson was able
to characterize Luttig's entire analysis as seeking "to constitutionalize a
right to postconviction DNA testing in federal court in the first instance. 2 12
From this point, Wilkinson paid little heed to the literal wording of
Heck but rather looked to the broader themes of the Preiser-Heck line of
cases. Wilkinson suggested that Luttig has not learned "the lesson" of
Preiser and that he misses "the whole point" of Heck.2 13 The "fundamental
doctrine" of giving state courts the first crack at these kinds of cases derives
from considerations of federalism and comity, and would be frustrated by
permitting state prisoners to evade state exhaustion "'by the simple
expedient' of putting a § 1983 label on their pleadings. 2 14  Because of
these deeper narratives, Wilkinson suggested that Luttig's reading of Heck
is "inconceivable."2 15
In Wilkinson's final analysis, the story of Harvey's § 1983 complaint
begins and ends with the assertion of innocence. Regardless of Heck's
technical command, Wilkinson categorized Harvey's § 1983 action as non-
cognizable because of Harvey's obvious intent of attacking his state court
207 See id. at 298-99, 301-02, 304 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc).
208 Id. at 299.
209 See id. at 301-03.
210 Id. at 299.
211 id.
212 Id. at 303.
213 id.
214 Id. (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-92 & n.10 (1973)).
215 Id. at 304.
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conviction.216 Consistent with his narrative logos, Wilkinson even charged
Luttig with deviating from the received script for American democracy:
"With little hesitation, my colleague disregards the roles of all the other
actors in the American system., 217 Wilkinson effectively cast himself into
this morality play as the vigilant watchdog calling out his brother Luttig, the
activist judge.
218
V. LOGOS AND COHESION: POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING AND THE HECK
RULE
The logos framework I have developed and applied to the
postconviction DNA testing discourse is purely descriptive. Based on an
analysis of the progression of their arguments, I have described Luttig's
Heck argument as employing a formal logos to justify a rule whereas
Wilkinson's argument adopted a narrative logos to explain the impetus
behind Preiser-Heck. On its own, this rhetorical model does not prescribe
what arguments are "correct" in the Heck debate or predict which
arguments will persuade any given audience.
At the same time, the framework can facilitate insight beyond
description-whether normative, predictive, or some hybrid-through its
characterization of conflicting modes of proof (formal versus narrative) in
the narrow postconviction DNA debate. By applying a logos analysis to
describe the premises and inferences of Supreme Court cases in the Preiser-
Heck line, it becomes possible to compare the logic of Luttig's and
Wilkinson's arguments with the logic of the controlling jurisprudential
context. This comparison can justify claims about the fit between
arguments and the surrounding law.219
216 Id. at 303 ("[Harvey's complaint] has all the earmarks of a deliberate attempt to
subvert the exhaustion requirement of [federal habeas corpus].") (quoting Hamlin v. Warren,
664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1981)).
217 Id. at 304. Wilkinson similarly accuses Luttig of making Congress "a subordinate
player." Id.
21 See id at 303. This characterization may seem harsh, but it is certainly consistent
with Wilkinson's rhetorical tone. He suggests that Luttig's view would "deaden the lifeforce
of democracy" and warns that "with activism, what goes around comes around. Today's
merriment becomes tomorrow's mourning." Id. Wilkinson almost seems personally
annoyed at Luttig for not requesting a poll on the suggestion for a rehearing en banc. See id.
at 298.
219 Here, I borrow Professor Dworkin's locution. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
215 (1986) ("Integrity as a political ideal fits and explains features of our constitutional
structure and practice that are otherwise puzzling."). Arguments fit when they resonate. I
justify my own claim of Luttig's success in Heck by arguing that his logos fits with the logos
of the encompassing Supreme Court Preiser-Heck discourse. Again, using Dworkin's
phrasing, Luttig's logos brings "coherence with fundamental principle." Id. at 220.
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In this Part, I closely examine the Supreme Court's key Heck-line case
of Wilkinson v. Dotson220 and evaluate its impact on the federal court
conversation around the cognizability of § 1983 DNA access actions. On
my account, Dotson vindicates Luttig's formal logos as the logic
appropriate to the Preiser-Heck discourse. Dotson shows that Luttig read
the Heck rule in an appropriately formal and literal manner. Because
Luttig's logos resonated with the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence,
Luttig successfully persuaded subsequent federal courts to adopt similar
syllogistic reasoning. Accordingly, I predict that Luttig's logos will prevail
at the Supreme Court on the Preiser-Heck question presented in the
Osborne case.
A. PERSUASION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The rhetorical success of an argument ultimately depends on whether
it secures adherence in the relevant decision-making audience. In Luttig's
debate with Wilkinson, the relevant audience consists of federal judges who
considered the propriety of pressing DNA access claims under § 1983 after
Harvey II. From the perspective of persuading this audience, the rhetorical
strategies adopted by Wilkinson and Luttig each have risks and
shortcomings. Before evaluating the rhetorical success of their competing
logoi, I consider these risks and shortcomings.
For his part, Luttig's formal reading risks ignoring the practical
concerns that animate much of the relevant § 1983 discourse. Luttig's rule
would not require exhaustion of state remedies and federal judges rightfully
care about comity and exhaustion. The Supreme Court has certainly
celebrated this theme from Preiser to Heck and beyond. Given this,
perhaps the riskiest part of Luttig's rhetorical proof is his decision to not
cite any Supreme Court opinion from Heck's family tree except Heck itself.
Luttig limited his genealogical justification to a single paragraph from a
single case. While this strategy places a burning spotlight on the Heck rule,
the relentless focus could also appear myopic.
At the same time, Chief Judge Wilkinson's failure to directly engage
Luttig's textual analysis of the Heck rule seems jarring given his reliance on
the same rule in Harvey L The salience of this silence is compounded by
Wilkinson's decision to make a charge of judicial activism. Luttig's
meticulous reading of Heck and insistence on following its precedential
command are certainly not hallmarks of judicial activism. At a more
visceral level, the activism accusation-at least the accusation of pro-
Dworkin's central concept of "law as integrity" also resonates with my argument for logos as
discursive coherence. See infra note 248.
220 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
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criminal defendant activism-rings hollow when levied against an
individual whose Federalist Society bona fides are well-known.22'
So, what happened? In the immediate aftermath of Harvey II, the
judicial audience split on its preferred Heck logos. Three months after
Harvey I was decided, the Fifth Circuit dismissed a § 1983 DNA access
complaint under Heck.222 In a per curiam opinion citing Harvey I as
"strongly persuasive," the court noted that Richard William Kutzner's DNA
access action was "so intertwined" with an attack on his confinement that
success would "'necessarily imply' revocation ... of confinement. ''223 A
month later, the Sixth Circuit found Heck barred John Boyle's DNA
224action. In an unpublished opinion that did not cite Harvey, the court held
that Boyle "plainly challenged the validity of his criminal convictions ...
[and] that the exclusive federal remedy for his claims was ...habeas
,,225corpus. Finally, a week following Boyle, the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether Heck barred Danny Joe Bradley's § 1983 complaint.226
After discussing Harvey I, the court actually quoted Luttig's Heck
syllogism in its entirety before explicitly siding with him, holding that
Bradley's complaint did not "'necessarily imply' the invalidity of [his]
conviction. 227
At this point in 2002, it seemed that neither Wilkinson nor Luttig had
entirely dominated the discourse. No immediate consensus had coalesced
over the appropriate logos governing the operation of Heck argument in the
22 1 Luttig has conservative ethos or credibility. Because of his conservative credentials,
Federalist Society stalwarts favored Judge Luttig's nomination to the Supreme Court when
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's retirements seemed
imminent. See Stephen G. Calabresi, Pirates We Be, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A14
(Federalist society cofounder endorsing Luttig for associate justice); The Week, NAT'L REV.,
June 16, 2003 (expressing hope for a Supreme Court with Chief Justice Scalia with an
Associate Justice Luttig).
222 See Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (2002).
223 Id. (citing Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2002); Martinez v.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 292 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 2002)). Kutzner was
ultimately executed without DNA testing earlier on the same day that the opinion was
published. See id. at 340 n.1.
224 Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340, 341 (6th Cir. 2002). The continuing viability of
this unpublished decision is subject to question. See infra note 266.
225 Id. at 340. Boyle did not seek a writ of certiorari.
226 Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287 (11 th Cir. 2002).
227 See id. at 1290-92. After years of litigation, Bradley's § 1983 action was finally
dismissed in early February 2009. See Bradley v. King, 556 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir.
2009) (dismissing § 1983 action on grounds that some DNA testing had been conducted and
did not exclude Bradley, and no further discovery on missing evidence was necessary), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1306 (2009). On February 12, 2009, Bradley was executed by lethal
injection. Tom Gordon, Bradley Executed for 1983 Murder: Spent 26 Years on Death Row,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 13, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 2941510.
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DNA access context. Federal courts had not been persuaded about just
what the Heck rule meant and how the story behind Heck did or did not bear
on interpretation of its rule. This situation changed in 2005, I suggest, after
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson.2 ' Before
turning to Dotson, however, I wish to highlight one last gene in the
rhetorical DNA of this argument.
I have classified the Heck rule as the major premise or inference-
warrant of Luttig's syllogism. 229 As noted, this rule bars any § 1983 action
that "necessarily implies" the invalidity of a prisoner's conviction. I
maintain that the actual semantic backing of this rule could vary depending
on whether a formal or narrative logos is adopted. While Luttig rested his
analysis on the formally resonant word "necessity," the rule might
alternatively be read through the narratively resonant word "implies."
230
Though DNA testing will not necessarily prove a conviction invalid (it
could inculpate, after all), it could be argued that seeking DNA testing to
prove innocence implies that the prisoner was wrongfully convicted. In
other words, by filing a § 1983 action, the convict-plaintiff necessarily
implies that he is innocent.
In this sense, the Heck rule is equivocal. If "implies" is understood by
reference to a prisoner's subjective intent, DNA access actions become
illicit attacks on state court convictions. Conversely, if the germane
reference point for "implies" is the objective consequence of victory, these
§ 1983 actions are cognizable because inculpatory DNA results remain a
formal possibility. The rhetorical contest between Wilkinson and Luttig
thus pits Heck's rule as turning on narrative context versus logical
consequence.
B. WILKINSON V. DOTSON AND DISCURSIVE COHERENCE
Three years after Harvey II, the Supreme Court entered the realm of
this rhetorical contest. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, the Court decided the
consolidated appeal of two Ohio prisoners who had challenged parole
procedures using § 1983.231 Both prisoners alleged that the Ohio board had
denied them parole using procedures that violated the Ex Post Facto
22 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
229 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
230 I label "necessary" as formally resonant because it is the word used to describe the
conclusions of a valid syllogism (they are logically necessary). See supra Figure 1. I label
"implies" as narratively resonant because "implication" suggests a non-explicit or context-
dependent inference. What is implied depends on the story behind the implication.




Clause.232 They sought injunctive relief in the form of access to a new
parole hearing operated under adequate procedures. 233 In both cases, the
district court found that Heck barred the actions and that federal habeas
provided the sole remedy for these challenges.234 The Sixth Circuit
reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.235
In its argument to the Court, the State of Ohio had insisted that the
narrative context drove the interpretation of the Heck rule. As the Court
summarized:
Ohio points out that the inmates in these cases attack their [parole proceedings] only
because they believe that victory on their claims will lead to a speedier release from
prison. Consequently, Ohio argues, the prisoners' lawsuits, in effect, collaterally
attack the duration of their confinement; hence, such a claim may only be brought
through a habeas corpus action ....236
However, the Court then explicitly rejected the logical inference of this
argument: "The problem with Ohio's argument lies in its jump from a true
premise (that in all likelihood the prisoners hope these actions will help
bring about earlier release) to a faulty conclusion (that habeas is their sole
avenue for relief). 2 37  To justify this characterization, the Court then
surveyed its own case law from Preiser through Heck to a case called
Edwards v. Balisok.38 Summarizing, the Court stated that the cases, "taken
together, indicate that a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred ... if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration.'
239
With this version of the Heck rule established as its major premise, the
Court turned to its minor premise. Here the Court enumerated all the
formal possibilities entailed by allowing respondents access to a new parole
hearing:
232 Id. For both Dotson and Johnson, the parole board used guidelines enacted after
respondents began serving their prison terms. Johnson also complained that the parole board
proceedings had too few members and denied him the opportunity to speak.
233 id.
234 Id. at 77.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 78.
237 id.
238 See id. at 78-81 (analyzing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). In this review, the Court made good use of italics, just as
it had done in Heck, to emphasize the difference between cases that "would not necessarily
spell immediate or speedier release" and those "where success would necessarily imply the
unlawfulness of a ... conviction or sentence." Id. at 81 (characterizing the rule from Wolff
v. McDonnell).
239 Id. at 81-82.
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Success for Dotson does not mean immediate release from confinement or a shorter
stay in prison; it means at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed
consideration of a new parole application. Success for Johnson means at most a new
parole hearing at which Ohio parole authorities may, in their discretion, decline to
shorten his prison term.
240
Because "neither prisoner's claim would necessarily spell speedier release,
neither lies at 'the core of habeas corpus.',
24 1
It should be apparent that the Dotson Court's approach to Heck
embraced a largely formal logos. First, the Court argued in a readily
identifiable syllogistic structure. Admittedly, the Court backed its major
premise (the Heck rule) by reference to "the legal journey from Preiser to
Balisok.''242 While this is a more narrative justification for its inference-
warrant than Luttig's single-minded parsing of Heck alone, the end result
was a similar use of the language of logic-including an emphasis on the
formally resonant term necessity. More than this, the Court actually backed
away from a "necessarily implies" formulation of the Heck rule and moved
to a "necessarily demonstrates" one.243 Demonstration, of course, is the
244
technical term for a formal proof that is beyond argument. Even
colloquially, the word "demonstration" carries none of the context-begging,
narrative connotations of "implication."
Perhaps the best indication of the Court's formal logos in Dotson came
in its answer to Ohio's familiar argument that "a decision in favor of
respondents would break faith with principles of federal/state comity by
opening the door to federal court without prior exhaustion of state-court
remedies. 24 5 Here the Court stated:
Our earlier cases, however, have already placed the State's important comity
considerations in the balance, weighed them against the competing need to vindicate
federal rights without exhaustion, and concluded that prisoners may bring their claims
without fully exhausting state-court remedies so long as their suits, if established,
would not necessarily invalidate state-imposed confinement.
246
240 Id. (citations omitted).
241 Id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 489).
242 Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81.
243 It should be noted that though Luttig focused on the "necessarily implies"
formulation, Heck itself also used the "necessarily demonstrates" one. See Heck, 512 U.S.at
487 ("But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will
not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the
action should be allowed to proceed."). However, I argue that until Dotson cleared it up, the
use of both "implies" and "demonstrates" potentially rendered the Heck rule equivocal.
244 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 13-14; see also RHETORIC-
KENNEDY TR., supra note 19, at 33 n.20.




Put differently, the Court asserted that the Heck rule already accounts for
this "morality of process" concern.
Critics might decry the apparently circular reasoning of this
response-the justification for the rule's impact on comity is made by
reference to the rule itself. However, this is not a "vicious" circularity;
247
rather it is a rhetorical move that affirms the fundamental discursive
coherence of the rule. The rule means exactly what it says, assured the
Court, and it appropriately balances all the competing concerns in the
discourse.
This notion of "discursive coherence" underlies and unites all of the
different categories of logos. Logos is what makes a discourse rationally
coherent. Coherence, in turn, describes whether collections of concepts-
sets of ideas, words, propositions, and the like--"hang together" or "make
sense" as a whole.248  Coherence may have formal,24 9 empirical,25 °
narrative, categorical,252 or other aspects.253 Depending on the moment, a
247 See KUHN, supra note 184, at 208 (describing a circular argument as non-"vicious").
Kuhn recognized that circular arguments are inevitable "[w]hen paradigms enter, as they
must, into a debate about paradigm choice.... Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in
that paradigm's defense." Id. at. 94. There is nothing "wrong or even ineffectual" about
such argument; but whatever its force, "the status of circular argument is only that of
persuasion." Id. Here, the Dotson Court is precisely justifying its own formal paradigm by
reference to its own rule.
248 MACCORMICK, supra note 33, at 190. Coherence is considered a prerequisite for
rational assessment of argument. See TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 20, at
158. Coherence might also be viewed as a "system of meaning" or evincing "integrity." See
DWORKIN, supra note 219, at 243 ("Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is
possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness
and procedural due process .... ); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 193 (1985) ("There are at least two respects in which
the law can make sense or fail to do so, two kinds of coherence to look for: internal and
external. We can ask, that is, whether the law is internally consistent-whether it makes
sense on its own terms; and we can ask whether it fits in a coherent way with the other things
we do, with the other conceptions we have of ourselves.").
249 See generally supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. Formal coherence, in my
account, subsumes formal consistency (non-contradiction). See MACCORMICK, supra note
33, at 190. Though Professor MacCormick distinguishes consistency from coherence, I see
both concepts as sounding in logos.
250 See generally supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. See also Dewey, supra note
28, at 26.
251 See generally supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. See also MACCORMICK,
supra note 33, at 229-36 (analyzing normative and narrative coherence in law).
252 See generally supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. Categorical coherence is
vital to the success of paradigms, theories, or other accounts. In my view, it is no accident
that the first book of Aristotle's Organon concerns categories. See Aristotle: I, in 8 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD vii (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al., eds., 31 st prig. 1989)
(Organon consists of six books: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior
Analytics, Topics, and On Sophistical Refutations). The Aristotelian concepts of logos,
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different logos aspect may have greater relevance or resonance in the
discourse.254 In Dotson, the Supreme Court made clear that a formal
reading of the Heck rule made § 1983 discourse coherent. More precisely,
the Dotson Court explained that a formal reading of Heck draws a coherent
boundary between § 1983 and federal habeas.
The discursive coherence rendered by the Supreme Court's formal
approach to the Heck rule might be usefully stated in formal vocabulary.
The effort to dispel any residual ambiguity from the Heck rule can be seen
as an attempt to make the rule univocal. A symbol, rule, or proposition is
univocal if it admits but one possible meaning in a discourse. The search
for "unquestionable univocity" lies at the very heart of formal logic because
without univocity, formal systems cannot function coherently.255 Of course,
law is not a formal logical system where pure univocity is possible.
However, if Dotson effectively rendered Heck univocal, it would similarly
transform debate over the rule's application into a mechanical calculation
beyond dispute.256
ethos, and pathos stand as the central categorical underpinnings of my own account. See
supra Part II.A.
253 One example of an "other" aspect of coherence is psychological. See Dan Simon, A
Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 511, 512 (2004) (exploring legal implications of "an emerging body of research called
coherence-based reasoning."). The research is in experimentally based cognitive
psychological theory that suggests that "decisions are made effectively and comfortably
when based on coherent mental models. . . . A mental model of a decision is deemed
'coherent' when the decision-maker perceives the chosen alternative to be supported by
strong considerations while the considerations that support the rejected alternative are
weak." Id. at 516.
254 This discursive conception of relevance or resonance is similar to that of "presence"
in Perelman's work. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 116 ("By the
very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience, their importance
and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows these elements
with a presence, which is an essential factor in argumentation .... "). Presence, relevance,
and resonance also bear a familial relationship to terms like salience and valence.
255 See id. at 13 ("The only obligation resting on the builder of formal axiomatic systems,
the one that gives the demonstrations their compelling force, is that of choosing symbols and
rules in such a way as to avoid doubt and ambiguity. It must be possible, without hesitation,
even mechanically, to establish whether a sequence of symbols is admitted in the
system .... The search for unquestionable univocity has even led formalistic logicians to
construct systems in which no attention is paid to the meaning of the expressions: they are
satisfied if the symbols introduced and the transformations concerning them are beyond
discussion.").
256 1 use the phrase "mechanical calculation" advisedly given the historical success of the
Realist critique of "mechanical jurisprudence." See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 28, at 22;
Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 606-07 (1908). I do not
mean to resurrect the discredited Formalist view, which claims that deductive application of
prior principles to present facts logically determines outcomes. See supra notes 27-28.
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As it happened, after the flurry of activity in 2002, federal courts did
not publish any decision in the § 1983 DNA access discourse until after
Dotson. In September 2005, the Ninth Circuit issued its first opinion in
William Osborne's case. Directly citing Luttig's language concerning the
"scientific possibilities" of DNA access, the court concluded that "as a
matter of logic" no Heck bar existed.257 The Osborne court added that
Dotson removed "any doubt as to propriety of [Luttig's] approach" because
the Dotson Court "reads 'necessarily' to mean 'inevitably.'
258
A year later, the Seventh Circuit sided with the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits on the Heck issue in Johnnie Lee Savory's case. 259 The Savory
court once again specifically cited Luttig's minor-premise language
regarding "scientific possibilities.
'" 260
Finally, the Second Circuit confronted Heck in 2007 in Frank
McKithen's case.261  Defining the test as whether victory would
"necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [a] conviction,, 262 the McKithen
court again cited Luttig's minor premise in concluding that no Heck bar
exists. 26 3 The court further suggested that previous courts finding Heck bars
had employed reasoning "no longer tenable after Dotson" and that its own
view expressed "an emerging consensus. 264
However, I do suggest that formal logos may be appropriate in legal discourses that value
bright-line and univocal rules.
257 Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298,
308 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en bane)).
25s Id. at 1055 (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. at 78-82). Of course, the Osborne case remains
in litigation-it is the case now before the Supreme Court. See supra note 1.
259 Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006).
260 Id. at 671 (citing Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11 th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc)). Despite
siding with Savory on the Heck question, the Seventh Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of
Savory's action on statute of limitations grounds. Id. at 669. Savory unsuccessfully sought
certiorari, bringing his federal litigation to an end. Savory v. Lyons, 550 U.S. 960 (2007)
(mem.). In 2006, Johnnie Lee Savory was released from prison on parole and continues to
this day to seek DNA testing and proclaim his innocence. See Karoun Demirjian, Convict's
Allies Ask Governor for Aid, DNA Test Sought in Case of Double Murder in '70s, CHI.
TRIn., Jan. 18, 2008, at C3.
261 McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
262 Id. at 102. It is worth noting that the McKithen court engaged in a fairly extended
review of Supreme Court cases from Preiser to Dotson before reaching this conclusion. See
id. at 99-102.
263 See id at 102-03 (citing Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of
rehearing en bane)).
264 Id. at 103. Aside from the Eleventh, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits, the McKithen court
cited to district courts in the First and Third Circuits as evidence of this consensus. See id. at
99 (citing, inter alia, Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (D. Mass. 2006); Derrickson
v. Delaware County, No. 04-1569, 2006 WL 2135854, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006)). It
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C. PREDICTION: NO HECK BAR IN OSBORNE
At this point, it seems fair to declare that Luttig's logos in Heck has
proved itself the better. Admittedly, the consensus is not complete as
district courts in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have continued to follow pre-
Dotson precedent 26 5-though not universally.266 And without question, it
remains a theoretical possibility that the Supreme Court will find that a
DNA access action does "necessarily demonstrate" the invalidity of an
underlying conviction when it decides the question this term. However, I
am confident that Luttig's logos will prevail and predict that Heck will
present no bar to William Osborne's § 1983 DNA access action.
In the final analysis, the reason I deem Luttig's logos the victor is that
it better resonates with the formal character of the underlying discourse. In
the argument with Wilkinson, Luttig's syllogistic premises have gained
adherence as the accepted starting points of legal proof. Concerns over the
morality of process and state court exhaustion have been explicitly folded
into the Heck rule itself, which now signs univocally. And, it should now
be accepted ex concessis that the narrative context of a prisoner's § 1983
DNA access action-his subjective belief that he will prove his
innocence-has no relevance to the essential logic at play. Given that DNA
testing could inculpate and prove a conviction's evidentiary validity, and
given further that this is precisely what happened in James Harvey's case,
the inference that Heck presents no bar should follow deductively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through the foregoing, I have sought to persuade readers of this
Article of three basic claims: (1) that Luttig's Harvey II concurrence has
should be noted, however, that Derrickson is not a DNA access case. The McKithen case
remains in litigation. See McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), appeal
filed, No. 08-4002-pr (2d Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2008).
265 See Gilkey v. Livingston, Nos. 3:06-1903, 3:06-1904, 3:06-1905, 2007 WL 1953456,
*5 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2007) (following Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 399,
340-1 (5th Cir. 2002)); Smith v. Worthy, No. 4:07-10243, 2007 WL 295007, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 29, 2007) (following Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340, 341 (6th Cir. 2002)).
266 In Alley v. Key, a court in the Western District of Tennessee stated that "[t]he [Heck]
issue appears to be one of first impression in this Circuit" and found no Heck bar. 431 F.
Supp. 2d 790, 795 (W.D. Tenn. 2006). Of course, the Sixth Circuit had actually ruled on the
issue in its unpublished Boyle case. See Boyle, 46 F. App'x at 341. Though the Alley court
came to the opposite conclusion of the Boyle court, it also ruled against Alley on
constitutional grounds. See Alley, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 795, 800-04. Alley appealed but the
state did not cross-appeal the Heck ruling. In another unpublished case, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling without mentioning its apparent mistake on the Heck
issue. See Alley v. Key, No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364, at *2 (6th Cir. May 14, 2006).
This is somewhat surprising since Chief Judge Boggs sat on both the Boyle and Alley panels.
In the end, this curious saga supports the conclusion that Boyle's viability is suspect at best.
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exerted a singularly persuasive influence on the § 1983 DNA access
discourse; (2) that Luttig's rhetorical sway derives significantly from the
formal logos of his argument; and (3) that what made Luttig's logos
compelling includes its resonance with the formal logos of the Supreme
Court's analysis of Heck in Dotson. I sought to establish these claims using
a rhetorical method that first compared the competing premises, inferences,
and conclusions in Harvey II's Luttig and Wilkinson opinions and then
examined how subsequent courts regarded their incommensurable
arguments. In the end, I found that though Wilkinson's Heck analysis was
both reasonable and backed by precedent, his narrative interpretation of
Heck's rule proved inconsistent with the Court's more formalistic approach
to the relevant doctrine.
Inferring further from these descriptive and explanatory claims, I have
also hazarded a prediction as to how the Court will rule on the Heck
question in Osborne. My prediction proceeds from two potentially
vulnerable assumptions. First, I assume that the Court will accept that the
Heck rule signs univocally, and that its relevance has been established ex
concessis. Second, I take for granted that Luttig is correct in regarding
Heck's procedural question as logically severable from the substantive
constitutional question. Naturally, neither of these premises is assured a
priori.267 The Court is not bound by its own precedent and could chose to
overrule Dotson if a majority both accepts the primacy of Wilkinson's
morality-of-process/institutional competence concern and wishes to avoid
pronouncing on the constitutional question.
Though possible, I do not think this outcome is likely. At a theoretical
level, a formal reading of Heck actually seems appropriate because it
provides a "rule of recognition" for determining subject matter
jurisdiction. 268 Creating a bright-line, easy-to-apply "rule" makes sense for
courts seeking a coherent boundary between § 1983 and federal habeas.269
267 My prediction here is thus not a formal argument. Rather, I am making an essentially
narrative claim that the story of the discourse so far points in the direction of Heck
presenting no bar to a § 1983 DNA access claim.
268 Professor H.L.A. Hart famously advanced the concept of "rules of recognition" in
law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-110 (2d ed. 1994). In Hart's account,
jurisdictional rules are both rules of adjudication and rules of recognition. See id. at 97
("[T]he rule which confers jurisdiction will also be a rule of recognition, identifying the
primary rules through the judgments of the courts and these judgments will become a
'source' of law.").
269 A jurisdictional situation favors rules over standards. See SCHAUER, supra note 59, at
231-32 ("[T]he essence of rule-based decision-making lies in the concept of jurisdiction, for
rules, which narrow the range of factors to be considered by particular decision-makers,
establish and constrain the jurisdiction of those decision-makers."). In my account, rules
employ a formal logos while standards employ a narrative logos. See supra notes 59, 73.
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As a practical matter, even if the Court wishes to rule against Osborne,
upsetting stare decisis and overruling Dotson hardly seems worth the effort
and inevitable doctrinal contortions given that the constitutional right
asserted has never been recognized. It just seems simpler rhetorically to
permit the action to proceed under Heck but find no underlying
postconviction constitutional right to access DNA evidence.
270
Of course, I have not undertaken a rhetorical analysis of the
constitutional question in this Article. However, Luttig and Wilkinson did
vigorously dispute the issue in Harvey II and I imagine that the resolution
of the constitutional debate will depend on how the Court perceives the
merits of two jurists' competing first principles. Is this debate really about
accuracy versus finality in law? Or is it about the moral competence of
federal courts to override state criminal processes? The relative resonance
of these starting points will inevitably guide what categories of doctrine are
seen as relevant and what logos will dominate.27'
Whether I am right or wrong in my prediction, I hope that my
rhetorical approach to analyzing arguments retains methodological appeal.
Any argument, I have argued, exists in layers of discourse. Persuasive
success depends on the audience and how it perceives the demands of
proof. To help navigate this complicated terrain, I proposed a loose
taxonomy that distinguishes between formal, empirical, narrative, and
categorical types of logos. By focusing on legal logos, I aimed to
emphasize the role of reason in legal argument and suggest that reasoned
proof works differently depending on the status of premises and the nature
of its inferences.
Certainly, persuasion in law will also depend on the ethos and pathos
of arguments. I do not mean to suggest that law is an objective science. At
the same time, by exploring the role of various logoi in legal argument, I
hope to counter the notion that persuasion in law is utterly subjective and
beyond the purview of "logic." Where reason matters, I maintain, logos
matters too. Though I applied my rhetorical framework to disentangle a
single argument about DNA, this framework might also usefully elucidate
the DNA of other legal arguments.
270 This is exactly what courts in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have done. See
Thompson v. McCollum, 253 F. App'x 11, 13-15 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (citing Grayson v. King,
460 F.3d 1328, 1339-42 (1 1th Cir. 2006)) (finding Thompson had no constitutional right);
Thompson v. Crist, 200 F. App'x 895, 897 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (citing Bradley v. Pryor, 305
F.3d. 1287, 1290-91 (1 1th Cir. 2002)) (finding no Heck bar); Alley, 431 F. Supp. 2d 790
(finding no Heck bar but no constitutional right), affd 2006 WL 1313364 (6th Cir. May 14,
2006).
271 In the terms of my rhetorical framework, a constitutional contest that involves battles
of analogy over relevant doctrine would be said to involve categorical logos. See supra




On June 18, 2009, the Supreme Court issued its Osborne opinion.272
In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on the ground that
Osborne did not have "a right under the Due Process Clause to obtain
postconviction access to the State's evidence for DNA testing. 273 On the
question of § 1983's procedural propriety, the Court wrote:
While we granted certiorari on this question, our resolution of Osborne's claims does
not require us to resolve this difficult issue. Accordingly, we will assume without
deciding that the Court of Appeals was correct that Heck does not bar Osborne's
§ 1983 claim. Even under this assumption, it was wrong to find a due process
violation.
274
In other words, the majority did not find a Heck bar but also did not
technically rule out that such a bar could exist.
While I certainly did not predict that the Court would duck the Heck
issue, I do not think the ultimate resolution at all falsifies my prediction.
After all, no Heck bar was found. Furthermore, it seems evident that only
two members of the Court actually would have found a Heck bar: Justices
Alito and Kennedy.275 The failure of these two justices to act in accordance
with what I characterized as Dotson's formal logos might be fairly
attributed to the fact that Kennedy was the sole dissenter in Dotson and that
Alito was not on the Court when Dotson was decided.276
Though the existence of two votes in favor of finding a Heck bar
undeniably presents some challenge to my rhetorical analysis, 277 the force
of this challenge is considerably weakened by the fact that four justices
272 Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
273 Id. at 2316. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court's opinion and was joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.
274 Id. at 2319.
275 While the majority technically did not decide the question, Justice Alito wrote a
separate opinion in which he expressed his view that though "it is sometimes difficult to
draw the line between claims that are properly brought in habeas and those that may be
brought under [§] 1983 ... [Osborne's action] falls on the habeas side of the line." Id. at
2324 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy joined in this opinion. See id. at 2312.
Though Justice Thomas joined Part II of Alito's opinion, he did not join Part I, wherein Alito
made his Heck argument. Id.
276 See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 88-92 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
277 Given Alito's dissent, I concede that a fair critique of my rhetorical method is that it
unwisely neglected to analyze the potential impact of Kennedy's lone dissent on the Heck
question in Osborne. Kennedy appears to have remained unpersuaded by Dotson and his
analysis seems to have swayed Justice Alito. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2325 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. at 92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Though Alito did
technically distinguish Dotson, id. at 2325 n.1, the general strategy of his concurrence is to
ignore that case rather than engage its analysis of the "necessarily demonstrates" formulation
of the Heck rule.
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unambiguously voted against imposing a bar and wholly relied on Luttig in
doing so. The first footnote of the main dissent 278 reads: "Because the
Court assumes arguendo that Osborne's claim was properly brought under
[§] 1983, rather than by an application for the writ of habeas corpus, I shall
state only that I agree with the Ninth Circuit's endorsement of Judge
Luttig's analysis of that issue. 279
The dissent thus confines its entire analysis of the Heck issue to an
explicit adoption of Judge Luttig's argument. It is hard to imagine a more
pithy or powerful endorsement of Judge Luttig's logos.
While acknowledging the theoretical possibility that the Court would
find a Heck bar, I had observed that this would require "doctrinal
contortions" and that if the Court wished to rule against Osborne, "[i]t just
seems simpler rhetorically to permit the action to proceed under Heck but
find no underlying post-conviction constitutional right to access DNA
evidence." 280 In the end, this aspect of my rhetorical analysis was entirely
vindicated. What I failed to anticipate, however, is that the Court would
employ this tactic to avoid actual analysis of the procedural question.
Before concluding this Epilogue, a brief discussion of how the Court's
resolution of the constitutional issue reflects upon my general rhetorical
analysis is in order. Though I did not undertake a specific inquiry into the
persuasive dynamics of the constitutional discourse, I suggested its
resolution depended on the same competing first principles articulated by
Luttig and Wilkinson in Harvey II: "Is this debate really about accuracy
versus finality in law? Or is it about the moral competence of federal courts
to override state criminal processes? '281  As it happens, these
incommensurable starting points did end up driving the competing proofs in
the Osborne majority and dissenting arguments. 82
The majority opinion clearly analyzed the issue as one of institutional
competence. The existence of Alaska procedures to obtain postconviction
DNA testing formed the opinion's "starting point in analyzing Osborne's
constitutional claims. ;2 83  After finding "nothing inadequate" about
278 Justice Stevens wrote the primary dissent, which was joined by justices Ginsburg and
Breyer. Id. at 2312. Justice Souter joined Part I of Justice Stevens' dissent (which includes
footnote I regarding the Heck issue) and also wrote a separate dissent. Id.
279 Id. at 2331 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
280 See supra p. 152. As I noted, this strategy was adopted by the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits. See supra note 269.
281 See supra pp. 152-53.
282 For the sake of simplicity, I confine my analysis here to Chief Justice Roberts'
majority opinion and Justice Stevens' main dissent.
283 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318.
2009] 1099
COLIN STARGER
Alaska's procedures, 284 the Court deliberately echoed Wilkinson in
declining to "short-circuit" state legislative activity. 285  In the end, the
majority did not find DNA's accuracy relevant to a debate it sees as
fundamentally about the morality of federal courts overriding state
processes.286
By contrast, the dissent emphasized the accuracy of DNA and its
ability to prove to a certainty whether William Osborne committed the rape
for which he was convicted.2 87 Because DNA obtains "uniquely precise"
results, it can "ascertain the truth once and for all. 288  Quoting Judge
Luttig, the dissent contended that finality must give way when "objective
proof that the convicted actually did not commit the offense later becomes
available through the progress of science. ' 289 For its part, the dissent only
briefly engaged with the majority's institutional competence premise when
it disputed the empirical probability that finding a right for Osborne would
affect use of DNA testing in the states.29°
In addition to confirming Harvey H's rhetorical influence on the
postconviction DNA access discourse, I see the structure of the conflicting
premises from Osborne as evincing a categorical logos dispute.29' The
284 Id. at 2320. Here, the Court rejected Osborne's procedural due process theory.
285 Id. at 2322 ("To suddenly constitutionalize this area would short-circuit what looks to
be a prompt and considered legislative response."); cf Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d
370, 376 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J.) ("Permitting Harvey's § 1983 claim to proceed
would improperly short-circuit legislative activity by allowing judges, rather than
legislatures, to determine the contours of the right."). Here Roberts even directly cites
Wilkinson's questions from Harvey 11 designed to demonstrate how unwieldy involving the
federal courts in this process would be. Id. (citing Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 11), 285 F.3d
298, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C. J., concurring)). See supra note 176 and
accompanying text (analyzing this part of Wilkinson's opinion).
286 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2323 ("The question is whether further change will primarily
be made by legislative revision and judicial interpretation of the existing system, or whether
the Federal Judiciary must leap ahead-revising (or even discarding) the system by creating
a new constitutional right and taking over responsibility for refining it.").
287 Id. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The state of Alaska had conceded in briefing that
DNA could definitively resolve the question of Osborne's guilt or innocence. Id at 2337
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referencing Alaska's concession). The majority did not mention
this point.
288 Id. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Harvey If, 285 F.3d at 306 (Luttig, J.,
respecting denial of rehearing en banc)). Stevens repeatedly returns to Luttig's "oft-cited
opinion in Harvey" to support his own argumentation. Id. at 2335.
290 Id. at 2339. The dissent also analogizes the empirical claim made by the majority to
Justice Harlan's ultimately incorrect empirical judgment made in his 1966 Miranda v.
Arizona dissent. Id. at 2339 n.10 (citations omitted).
291 As I put it ex ante: "The relative resonance of these starting points will inevitably
guide what categories of doctrine are seen as relevant and what logos will dominate." See
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majority specifically rejected the idea that DNA's ability to demonstrate
error means that it "must be treated as categorically outside the [existing]
process, rather than within it."292 The dissent stressed that the ability of
DNA to prove Osborne's own guilt or innocence put his case in a
"narrow[ ] category" implicating "systemic interests in fairness and ultimate
truth., 293 As my logos taxonomy would suggest, the categorical dispute
subsequently resulted in fundamental disagreement over what families of
doctrine were relevant. 9
From this, it seems safe to conclude that my case study fairly
succeeded in describing the logos driving the federal postconviction DNA
access argument. Whether the framework might also usefully describe the
logic of persuasion in other doctrinal disputes remains to be seen.
supra pp. 152-153 and note 270 (further specifying this as a dispute involving categorical
logos).
292 Id. at 2323 (Roberts, C.J.).
293 Id. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig, J.,
respecting denial of rehearing en banc)).
294 For example, the majority rejected the analogy to Brady v. Maryland that the Ninth
Circuit had adopted in finding Osborne had a postconviction right. Id. at 2320 ("Brady is the
wrong framework."). The dissent countered that the fact of conviction "does not mean...
that our pretrial due process cases have no relevance in the post-conviction context." Id. at
2335 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
11012009]
1102 COLIN STARGER [Vol. 99
